Homeland Security Discussion Response

Responses should be a minimum of 250 words and include direct questions. You may challenge, support or supplement another student’s answer using the terms, concepts and theories from the required readings. Also, do not be afraid to respectfully disagree where you feel appropriate; as this should be part of your analysis process at this academic level.

Forum posts are graded on timeliness, relevance, knowledge of the weekly readings, and the quality of original ideas. Sources utilized to support answers are to be cited in accordance with the APA writing style by providing a general parenthetical citation (reference the author, year and page number) within your post, as well as an adjoining reference list. Refer to grading rubric for additional details concerning grading criteria.

Respond to Chad:

Good afternoon classmates and professor,

The roles and responsibilities of HSINT to counter CBRNE threats to the homeland requires a multifaceted approach that can be dynamically applied when needed. An interagency group to coordinate standards and response efforts among the various agencies involved is one responsibility. The situation would dictate the tactics with regard to this as a response by FEMA as dictated by their Incident Command System (ICS) may be appropriate, whereas the FBI’s Hazardous Material Response Unit (HMRU) may be more appropriate. Interagency cooperation between DHS (FEMA), DOJ (FBI) and/or DOD (National Guard) is necessary. Unfortunately, we suffer the burden of having so many resources that it may result in confusion as to who is responsible for doing what during an event such as a CBRNE incident. A 2010 article cited this by stating, “due to a lack of clarity over roles, missions, and responsibilities, we see a continued debate over who’s supposed to do what to whom in both areas. We talk about using a “whole of government” approach to CBRN terrorism, often focusing on the efforts of DOD, DHS, and DHHS (and other federal agencies). But this also commits the sin of blurring the difference between military operations and homeland security” (Mauroni, para. 22). Developing standard operating procedures for an incident with clear roles through all governmental levels is necessary. While I feel that ICS is an adequate model, I do not want to settle for adequate.

With regard to an effective HSINT response to a large-scale agro-terrorist attack, I would like to address prevention efforts before response efforts. I feel that while an attack on the agriculture of the U.S. by a terrorist group is unlikely as it does not have the immediate effect that shocks the conscience that is often sought by terrorist (the instant gratification of an IED, shooting, VBIED, etc.). However, improbable is not impossible and this threat needs to be addressed as an agro-terrorist attack would be shocking to the morale of the U.S. by exposing the vulnerability and soft underbelly of the backbone of our economy. The same network that is utilized by fusion centers, intelligence-led policing, private and public sectors, is needed to piece together information that can predict and prevent an agro-terrorist attack. This was noted in an article this week that stated, “Terrorists rely on a lack of preparedness, law enforcement agencies should develop a plan to prevent agro terrorism… must investigate from an agro terrorism perspective thefts of livestock; a criminal organization may steal animals with the intent of infecting them and placing them back into the population. Thefts of vaccines, medicines, and livestock-related equipment should be of concern and carefully investigated. It also is vital that law enforcement officials forward reports of such incidents to their states’ intelligence-fusion centers” (Olsen, 2012, para. 31).

In the event of a large scale agro-terrorism attack, it would behoove the IC to have in place a WMD/CBRNE for as many gradations of severity. A 2012 report by the Aspen Institute noted that while “several federal agencies have developed initiatives to address potentially catastrophic domestic WMD events” they have “not yet integrated into a coordinated federal whole” and “there is almost no planning that realistically incorporates federal, state, local and private sector resources into a unified WMD response” (p. 9). That same report references levels of readiness that varies between agencies and states. While I do feel that an on the fly response would suffice due to the capabilities of the involved agencies, I feel that better training and interagency planning would complement any response.

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