Sociology of Race and Racism

Description

There is two questions to be answered. For each question use 4 pages. So 8 pages total for both questions. Length: 8 pgs double-spaced + bibliography (4 pgs + bibliography per question). The questions are:  The incarceration of racialized people in Canada has been disproportionately high, particularly for Black and Indigenous people. What steps need to be taken and by whom to reduce the rate of incarceration of racialized people in Canada, particularly Black and Indigenous people? Briefly compare and contrast the concepts of colonialism, racism, assimilation, integration, and multiculturalism in a historical context of Canadian immigration and nation-building.  Answer those questions. Again each answer should be 4 pages total so 8 pages for both questions. Please include the references I have provided through file upload, you are also allowed to use outside sources from the ones i have provided as long as you have used up the sources from the ones i have provided. the essay should provide a clear and thorough introduction and background. it should  addresses the question thoroughly and state relevant arguments clearly. the essay structure should presents arguments in a logical order, demonstrates an accurate and complete understanding of the question also it should demonstrate an accurate and complete understanding of the concepts, theories or ideas Uses several arguments and backs arguments with examples, data that support the conclusion.

Sources to be used for both questions:

The incarceration of racialized people in Canada has been disproportionately high, particularly for Black and Indigenous people. What steps need to be taken and by whom to reduce the rate of incarceration of racialized people in Canada, particularly Black and Indigenous people?

https://muse.jhu.edu/article/757300

https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/2153368718760969

https://journals.sfu.ca/cje/index.php/cje-rce/article/view/3247
Briefly compare and contrast the concepts of colonialism, racism, assimilation, integration, and multiculturalism in a historical context of Canadian immigration and nation-building.

https://muse.jhu.edu/article/757300

https://journals.sfu.ca/cje/index.php/cje-rce/article/view/3247

https://eric.ed.gov/?id=EJ1046029

https://muse.jhu.edu/article/687421
ARTICLES REZA NAKHAIE Muslims, Socio-cultural Integration, and Pride in Canadian Democracy Abstract In this paper, I use the General Social Survey 2013 (Cycle 27) and address three aspects of integration anxiety about Muslims in Canada: a) the extent to which Muslim immigrants’ level of integration differs from other religious denominations, b) how Muslims differ from other groups in their support for democracy, and c) whether there is a relationship between integration and support for democracy. Results show that contrary to the anxiety of some academics, policymakers, and the public, Muslim immigrants in Canada are equally, if not more, integrated than Christians or other religious immigrants. They also express a higher sense of pride in Canadian democracy when compared to Christians or other religious groups. Finally, integrated immigrants have as much pride in Canadian democracy as assimilated ones, and both have more pride in Canadian democracy than those who are marginalized or have a separatist orientation. The implication of these findings for anxiety about Muslims’ incompatibility with Western values are discussed. Keywords: Religious denomination, cultural integration, democracy. Résumé Dans cet article, je me sers du sondage General Social Survey 2013 (cycle 27) et aborde trois aspects de l’anxiété de l’intégration chez les musulmans au Canada : a) l’étendue de laquelle le niveau d’intégration des immigrants musulmans diffère des autres confessions religieuses, b) comment les musulmans sont différents d’autres groupes dans leur soutien à la démocratie, et c) s’il existe une relation entre l’intégration et le soutien à la démocratie. Les résultats montrent que, contrairement à l’inquiétude de certains universitaires, décideurs et du public, les immigrants musulmans au Canada sont équitablement, sinon plus, intégrés que les chrétiens ou les immigrants des autres confessions religieuses. Ils expriment également un plus grand sentiment de fierté à l’égard de la démocratie canadienne par rapport aux chrétiens ou à d’autres groupes religieux. Enfin, les immigrants intégrés sont aussi fiers de la démocratie canadienne que les immigrants assimilés et tous les deux sont plus fiers de la démocratie canadienne que ceux qui sont marginalisés ou qui ont une orientation séparatiste. L’implication de ces résultats de l’anxiété à propos de l’incompatibilité des musulmans avec les valeurs occidentales est ainsi analysée. Mots-clés : Confession religieuse, intégration culturelle, démocratie. CES Volume 50 Number 3 (2018), 1-26 INTRODUCTION In recent years, Canada has experienced an increase in hate crimes against Muslims. For example, police reported that hate crimes against Muslims increased by 61 percent between between 2014 and 2015 (Fry 2018). A recent example of hate crime against Muslims include the shooting in Quebec city’s Islamic Cultural Centre which resulted in six worshipers being killed and 19 injured. Islomophobia, or the antiMuslim climate of hate and fear which presents Muslims as unwanted and a security threat, is not specific to Canada. It is also widespread and on the rise in Europe and the United States (see Banting 2014; Clements 2013; Fekete 2009; Minsky 2017). It is rooted in the idea of Islamic exceptionalism (for example, see Hamid 2016), which views Islam as different from Christianity (and Judaism) in how it relates to politics. State and religion are conceptualized as intertwined and inseparable in Islam, while they are viewed as being separate and distinct among Christians. Hamid contends that this key distinction has made Islam resistant to secularization and democracy. An offshoot of this belief is that Muslim immigrants are unable to integrate or unwilling to fit in in their new (Christian) society because their religious allegiance prevents national loyalties rooted in the separation of religion and politics (see Cesari 2006; Foner and Alba 2008). In Huntington’s (1996, 151) words, “the underlying problem for the West… is Islam” (also see Bawer 2010; Caldwell 2009; Foner and Alba 2008; Gellner 1997). In this paper, I will address the “integration anxiety” (Ley 2013) prevalent among immigrant-receiving societies by focusing on Muslim immigrants’ sense of belonging and their support for democracy in Canada. Using the General Social Survey Cycle 27 (2013), I will test whether Muslim immigrants’ levels of social-cultural integration and pride in Canadian democracy differ from other religious denominations and whether integration affects support for democracy. Results show that there is little ground for fear or integration anxiety about Muslim immigrants in Canada. SOCIO-CULTURAL INTEGRATION AND CANADIAN IDENTITY “Integration anxiety” about Muslims in Canada is partly related to the increase in the number of Muslim immigrants and refugees in recent decades. According to the 2011 National Household Survey, the percentage of Muslim Canadians doubled each decade from .9 percent in 1991 to 1.8 percent in 2001 and 3.2 percent in 2011. By 2030, the Muslim population in Canada is expected to reach 6.6 percent of the total population (Pew 2011). The anxiety is also related to a) the fact that the majority of Muslims in Canada are immigrants (72%) and most are recent immigrants from the 2 | Canadian Ethnic Studies/Études ethniques au Canada Middle East, South Asia, and Africa; b) controversies over Sharia law, the hejab and burqa, and fear of violent extremists; and c) the violent Jihadist movement that has shocked North America and the Western world. These events, coupled with the perceived incompatibility of the cultural values and beliefs of Muslims with the (Christian) majority host culture, have resulted in the Muslim question becoming the “subject of one of the hottest debates of our time” (Kazemipur 2014, 4) and Islam becoming the key site of demarcation between Muslims and other groups in Canada and Europe. Consequently, there has been intensified pressure on Muslims to integrate by identifing with the host society and accepting its core values, such as democracy and gender equality (see Statham and Tillie 2016). Integration is a contested, normative, and politicized concept (see Fokkema and de Hass 2015; Frideres 2008; Li 2003). Conceptually, the idea of integration grew out of, but is distinguishable from, the often exaggerated old American assimilation model which required immigrants to adjust to and fully merge into the dominant culture without a reciprocal adjustment of the host society. Although the new assimilation model (Alba and Nee 2003,14) is not one-directional Anglo-conformity and allows for changes in both mainstream and minority immigrant culture, it still envisions group convergence as the mainstream expands to accommodate cultural alternatives. In the new conceptualization, there not only occurs boundary crossing where individuals or groups “melt” into and become fully part of the mainstream institutional structures and organizations, but also boundary blurring through intermarriage or acceptance and inclusion of elements of the minority culture into that of the mainstream culture (Alba and Nee 2003, 282-287). The new model of assimilation predicts the emergence of an evolving master culture emerging from contact between newcomers and the host culture. Integration is often contrasted with assimilation and is a more “flexible” dimension of the new assimilation model. If assimilation is viewed as a one-way street where immigrants adopt the dominant, majority culture, integration gives immigrants rights to maintain their culture without expecting them to give up their social practices. Moreover, integration is a dynamic process, the content and outcome of which are determined by the nature of the interaction between newcomers and the host society (Kazemipur and Nakhaie 2013; Wilkinson 2013). As a two-way process, it requires that both (minority) immigrants and the (dominant) Canadian-born population change to acommodate one another (see Biles et al. 2008). Successful integration means that newcomers are entitled to be different (Li 2003, 12) and to experience their “authentic” culture (Kymlicka 1995). Integration is a process of recognition and acceptance of, and participation in, both cultural domains. It entails affective, cognitive, and behavioural attachment to one’s own group and adherence to the core values consistent with the host society’s culture (see Castles and Miller 2003). Reza Nakhaie | 3 At the subjective level, socio-cultural integration emphasizes identification and belonging. Kazemipur (2014, 32) suggests that a shared sense of national identity and belonging, or emotional attachment (i.e., “attachment at the level of soul”), is the “true measure” of socio-cultural integration. Banting and Soroka (2012) view socio-cultural integration as a simultaneous sense of belonging in, identification with, or a feeling of attachment to one’s own ethno-racial culture and that of the host society. Psychological and behavioural changes in sense of belonging or attachment at the level of soul because of sustained contact with members of other cultures does not necessarily result in assimilation but can produce other forms of acculturation (e.g., Berry 1997, 1999; Berry and Hou 2016; Berry and Kim 1988). Berry and his colleagues suggest that contact results in two fundamental avenues of acculturation: individuals can pursue cultural maintenance by preserving their cultural identity and characteristics of their cultural heritage, or they can interact with members of the host society and participate in their lives. Various ways in which newcomers relate to the host society are called acculturation strategies (Berry and Hou 2016). Accordingly, the newcomers’ evaluative responses to identification with the host society and their own ethnic origin can result in four “acculturation strategies”: a) integration (valuing cultural maintenance and culture of the host country, blending of cultures, allowing for cultural integrity, formation of dual identity, and working toward participation in the host society), b) assimilation (valuing the culture of the host country and being fully emerged in it but being unconcerned with one’s own cultural heritage), c) separation (valuing one’s own cultural heritage but being unconcerned with that of the host country, resulting in the maintenance of ethnic cultural identity), and d) marginalization (being unconcerned with either culture, resulting in alienation, confusion, stress, and anxiety). This typology allows for analytical distinctions between integration, assimilation, and lack of identification with either or both ethnic and host cultures, and will be used in this study. However, we do not claim that these “strategies” are selective in the sense that newcomers freely decide which strategy to pursue. On the contrary, these strategies are subject to people’s experiences as they move from one culture to another and therefore are shaped by the social and structural forces such as mobility opportunities and discrimination in the host society, among others. These powerful forces are important in generating various “acculturation strategies” during one’s life course. Similarly, these “strategies” are not constant. They are subject to change depending on the social and structural forces that one is embedded in or experiences in the host society. Newcomers who experience discrimination may maintain their culture and identify with their ethnicity, language or country of origin because of forced isolation rather an alternative strategy (see McCoy, Kirova, and Knight 2016). They are subject to a “diasporic impulse” (Moghissi et al. 2009). Alternatively, if they 4 | Canadian Ethnic Studies/Études ethniques au Canada experience a welcoming community with opportunities to improve their economic position, they may opt for assimilation or integration by identifying with and participating in the host culture. MUSLIMS AND INTEGRATION Over the past two decades, research on Muslim socio-cultural integration has proliferated in Europe (Aida, Laitin, and Valfort 2010; Bevelander and Otterbeck 2010; Clements 2013; Connor 2010; Ehrkamp 2010; Fekete 2008; Fetzer and Soper 2003; Kortmann 2012; Nollert and Sheikhzadegan 2016), Australia (Rane, Amath and Faris 2015), United States (Ajrouch 2007; Wuthnow and Hackett 2003) and Canada (see Cochrane 2013; Kazemipur 2014; Litchmore and Safdar 2015; Reitz 2015). Overall, previous research on socio-cultural integration of Muslims in Canada is limited and has primarily focused on how Muslims are comparatively integrated and how their level of integration differs by religiosity and experience of discrimination. Based on the Ethnic Diversity Survey, Reitz (2015) showed that the level of social integration (measured by intercultural friendship, voluntarism, trust, voting, and sense of belonging to Canada) of Muslims and Christian Canadians was about equal. McCoy, Kirova, and Knight’s (2016) study, also based on the Ethnic Diversity Survey and the Environic Survey, showed that Muslims indicated higher or similar levels of sense of belonging to Canada as the more established communities (e.g., Protestants), supporting the notion that Canadian Muslims are socio-culturally well-integrated. Their findings are consistent with the Environic surveys (2016). In both 2006 and 2016 surveys, the majority of Muslims stated that they want to adopt Canadian customs (55 and 53 percent, respectively). This survey also showed that both Muslim Canadians and other Canadians equally and overwhelmingly were “very proud” to be Canadians. In fact, Environic surveys in both 2006 and 2016 showed that Muslims, with the exception of those in Quebec, expressed a somewhat higher sense of pride in being Canadian than non-Muslims, and that Muslims about equally considered being Canadian and Muslim an important part of their identity (Environics 2016). However, Kazemipur’s (2014) study of several social surveys showed that Muslims among all religious groups are at the lower end of having attachment to Canada in terms of life satisfaction and trusting others. Berry and Kalin (1995) showed that Canadian respondents reported a lower comfort level being around Muslims than other groups (e.g., Europeans, Chinese, Blacks, West Indians). One implication of such social distance is that Muslims who experience discrimination, like other groups, tend to develop a higher sense of attachment to their own group because such an identity can be a potential source of empowerment in the face of a hostile environment (see McCoy, Kirova, and Knight Reza Nakhaie | 5 6 | Canadian Ethnic Studies/Études ethniques au Canada 2016). Litchmore and Safdar’s (2015) study of 77 Muslim students in Southern Ontario showed that second-generation Muslim students more than the first-generation students perceived discrimination. Similarly, Wright et al. (2017) showed that Americans and English Canadians were not generally supportive of Muslim accommodation and that Francophone Quebeckers showed the least support (also see Koopmans 2015; Joppke 2015; Statham and Tillie 2016; van der Noll and Soroglou 2015). Reitz (2015) reported an Environics Focus Canada survey conducted in 2010 showing that the majority of Canadian respondents (55%) thought that Muslims in Canada “want to be distinct” and only a minority (28%) thought that they want to “adopt Canadian customs and way of life.” Similar opposition to Muslim accommodation is found in the United States (see Sides and Gross 2013). In contrast, the Environics (2016) survey showed that the majority of Muslims themselves stated that they want to adopt Canadian customs (53 percent). This survey also showed that both Muslim Canadians and other Canadians equally and overwhelmingly were “very proud” to be Canadians. Cochrane’s (2013) study of Canadian Muslims’ opinions about same-sex marriage, using public opinion polls conducted by IPSOS (2006 and 2011), showed that religiosity, or what can be called “solidarity of the religious” (Clements 2013), rather than Islamic religion, heightens opposition to same-sex marriage. Similarly, Inglehart and Norris (2003) question the role of religious denomination and show that views about homosexuality are less related to religion and more to the level of Human Development among Muslim countries (also see Norris and Inglehart 2002). They showed that the higher the Human Development in a country, the more support for homosexuality. On the other hand, Statham and Tillie (2016) find few significant differences between Muslims from former Yugoslavia, Pakistan, Morocco, and Turkey in four European countries (UK, Germany, France, and the Netherlands) with respect to their opinions about teachers wearing religious symbols, religious classes in school, and mosque-building. Statham interpreted the findings to suggest that it is possible to speak about an overall Muslim opinion regarding group rights. MUSLIMS AND DEMOCRACY The idea that Islam is incompatible with Christianity or that Muslims cannot “fit in” with societies with Christian heritage suggests that there are sizable differences between Muslims in general, particularly Muslim immigrants, and Christians regarding their level of integration and support for democracy. This conclusion may be premature, as not only are research results inconsistent, but also there is no study of Muslims’ attitudes towards democracy in Canada, although there are a few inter- national studies. Doerchler and Jackson (2012) showed that Muslims were significantly more trusting of eight out of nine political and legal German institutions. They also showed that Muslims and non-Muslims in Germany exhibited a similar level of support for democracy and that Muslims, significantly more than nonMuslims, evaluated democracy positively. Similarly, Maxwell (2010) showed that Muslims more than Christians displayed trust for the British parliament. Schmeets and Te Riele (2014) confirmed that Muslims equally or more than other religious denominations trusted Dutch police, politicians, political parties, and national parliament. Gundelach (2010) showed that Muslim descendants and immigrants were less supportive of democratic principles and family democracy but more supportive of democratic rights than Danish Christians. In sum, there is a belief that the cultural views of Muslims are inconsistent with Christian cultural heritage. However, there is a void in the research about the integration of first-generation Muslim immigrants in Canada. Although there is evidence of higher integration of second- and third- compared to first-generation immigrants, the evidence is not conclusive. Gans (1973) has postulated that in the long run, immigrant children and their children or grandchildren become indistinguishable from the dominant groups. If so, the former two groups would have already been re-socialized into Canadian cultural and democratic values. As such, a study of first-generation immigrants is particularly relevant when it comes to disentangling the effect of religion from that of primary socialization in the country of destination. If Muslim religion is an important impediment to integration, then its effect should be evident among first-generation immigrants whose formative years were shaped in the country of origin. Furthermore, although Muslims in Europe generally value democracy, there is no research on Muslim immigrants’ views towards democracy in Canada in general or Canada’s constitution and adherence to diversity. Given a wide variety of differences in institutional practices and opportunity structures between Canada and European countries, it is not clear if views of Muslims on democracy in Europe can be extrapolated to Canada, particularly because of Canada’s well-established multicultural policies. Finally, there is a void in our knowledge about the relationship between integration and views towards democracy among Muslims and other groups in Canada or elsewhere. Although a relation between integration and support for democracy is expected, since one addresses socio-cultural integration and the other political integration, it has not been confirmed in previous research. Accordingly, it is important to evaluate the extent to which Muslim immigrants in Canada differ from other immigrant groups in their level of integration and support for democracy and whether or not integrated immigrants are supportive of democracy. Reza Nakhaie | 7 8 | Canadian Ethnic Studies/Études ethniques au Canada METHODOLOGY Data This paper uses the General Social Survey, cycle 27 (2013). This survey focused on social networks and engagement in Canada and included questions on sense of belonging, pride, shared values, and national symbols. The survey was a multi-stage sampling of twenty-eight strata of all ten provinces, including eighteen Canadian Metropolitan Areas (CMA) and ten non-CMA areas. Immigrants were oversampled in six of the eighteen CMAs (Montreal, Toronto, Winnipeg, Calgary, Edmonton, and Vancouver), and youth were oversampled in eight CMAs (Halifax, Montreal, Ottawa, Toronto, Winnipeg, Calgary, Edmonton, and Vancouver). The target population was respondents 15 years old and over, excluding those residing in territories or institutions. Data was collected through telephone interviews in the official language of the respondents’ choice using either landline or cellular telephones. Respondents who chose to complete the survey online were given an invitation passcode. In total, 27,534 respondents completed the survey with an overall response rate of 48.1 percent. Survey estimates have been adjusted to account for non-response cases. This study is based on 8,798 immigrants who completed all the relevant questions for this study. Multivariate analyses are based on 500 bootstrap weights provided in the public file to calculate robust standard errors. Measures Socio-cultural integration I define socio-cultural integration as simultaneous social-psychological identification or “sense of belonging” and attachment to Canada as a nation, a community, and a place of residence, and to one’s own ethnicity, language, and/or country of origin. This conceptualization is consistent with Vasta (2013), who points to multidimensionality of belonging at individual, community, local or national levels. A multi-measure of attachment also provides a more precise, reliable, and valid measure of subjective social-cultural integration and helps to reduce random error. Moreover, this utilization of multiple indicators of belonging to measure integration improves our conceptualization of integration which, in previous research, has been limited only to attachment to Canada and/or one’s own ethnic group. Doná and Berry (1994) were the first to use two dimensions of identity and then divide them into high and low to create four socio-cultural strategies. This is now a well-established and frequently used typology (see Berry 1997, 2003; Berry and Hou 2016; Berry and Sam 1997; Berry et al. 2006; Dona and Berry 1994; Schwartz and Zamboanga 2008). Accordingly, I created two indices—one for Canadian identity and another for ethno-cultural identity. The former included four questions asking respondents about their sense of belonging to 1) Canada, 2) their province, 3) their town or city, and 4) their local community, each measured in four response categories of very strong to very weak. Factor analysis of these four variables showed that they all load on one factor accounting for 65.9 percent of variance, with factor loadings of .74, .86, .86, and .78, respectively, and Cronbach’s Alpha of .82. These four variables are summed into an index of Canadian identity. Ethno-cultural identity is measured by three questions regarding sense of belonging to country of origin, people with the same ethnic/cultural background, and people with the same first language, each measured in four response categories of very strong to very weak. Factor analysis of these three variables showed that they all load on one factor accounting for 64.5 percent of variance, with factor loadings of .65, .88, and .86, respectively, and Cronbach’s Alpha of .71. These three variables are summated into an index of ethnocultural identity. Finally, these indices are dichotomized based on their medians. Those who scored above median in both indices are identified as integrationist. Those who scored above median in Canadian identity and below median in ethnic identity are labelled assimilationist. Those who scored above median on ethnic identity and below median on Canadian identity are called separationist. Finally, those who scored below median in both indices are identified as marginalized. Canadian democracy The fundamental values of the Western liberal democracies include support for freedom, tolerance, and equality. Although there is some controversy over the content and interpretation of the “core” values of democracy (see Statham and Tillie 2016), arguably, the Canadian constitution exemplifies such values. It has enshrined a notion of diversity, equality, and freedom that encourages social solidarity among individuals of diverse backgrounds. GSS 27 not only includes a question on support for the Canadian constitution but also solicits respondents’ views on diversity and the working of Canadian democracy. I relied on questions that tap respondents’ support for Canadian democracy in general and its charter of rights and treatment of diversity in particular. These include respondents’ sense of pride in each of the following: 1) the way democracy works, 2) Canada’s constitution, and 3) its treatment of all groups in society. Factor analysis of these three variables showed that they all load on one factor accounting for 62.8 percent of variance, with factor loadings of .79, .80, and .79, respectively, and Cronbach’s Alpha of .70. Religion The idea that Muslim immigrants cannot fit in with or integrate into the host society is fundamentally rooted in the perception that Islam is distinct from Christianity, in that the former’s religious beliefs and cultural orientations are incompatible with Reza Nakhaie | 9 10 | Canadian Ethnic Studies/Études ethniques au Canada the Western way of life and its democratic values. This perceived incompatibility prevents Muslim immigrants from “fitting in” or integrating into their new society and adhering to liberal democratic principles prevalent in the host society. In this study, I focus on five groups: Muslims, Christians, Jews, other religions (Buddhist, Hindu, and other religions), and non-religious groups. Moreover, religious groups (those who stated that religious and spiritual beliefs are very or somewhat important to them) are distinguished from non-religious groups (those who said such beliefs are not very important or not important at all). Discrimination Research has shown that discrimination can have a negative effect on integration and a positive effect on attachment to one’s own ethno-racial group. Feelings of social distance and discomfort are incompatible with the formation of a Canadian identity and integration into the host society. Such feelings may result in marginalization (Berry and Hou 2016; Nakhaie and Wijesingha 2015; Searle and Ward 1990; Vasta 2013). For example, Reitz and Banerjee (2007) showed that discrimination tends to decrease attachment to Canada. Discrimination is measured by 5 questions asking respondents if in the past five years they have experienced discrimination or have been unfairly treated by others in Canada based on their 1) ethnicity or culture, 2) race, 3) physical appearance, 4) religion, or 5) language. If respondents answered yes to any of these questions they were coded 1, otherwise 0. Length of residence The old assimilation model (see Alba and Nee 2003) suggested that ethnic groups in the US would quickly be absorbed into the American (i.e., middle class, Anglo-Saxon, white Protestant) way of life. This contested model emphasizes that immigrant assimilation progresses with the length of residence, due to contact with the host population, and across generations, due to socialization of immigrant children in the new society. Gans (1973) also postulates that the mere fact of living in a society with different cultural or political institutions modifies immigrants’ cultural and political values, skills, and behaviours. Immigrants learn by observing what members of the host society do (Aleksynska 2007). These models all emphasize the role of agencies of dominant cultural transmission such as educational, media, economic, and political institutions. Consequently, and consistent with the new assimilation model (Alba and Nee 2003), in the long run, it is expected that immigrants will have similar socioeconomic positions, social networks, cultural and political values, and behaviours as that of the mainstream population. Research has shown that the length of residence in the host society is related to increased support for gender equality among Muslims (Maliepaard and Alba 2016) and is amongst the strongest predictors of acculturation Reza Nakhaie | 11 (see Corak 2012). Length of residence is measured by the number of years since the respondent first came to Canada. Given changes in Canada’s Immigration Act, particularly since 1975-76, which set the basic framework for the contemporary immigration policy, and the increase in the number of Muslim immigrants and refugees after the first Gulf War in 1990, I created three groups of immigrants: those who arrived prior to 1974, those who arrived between 1975 and 1994, and those who immigrated after 1995. The latter group is used as the reference group. I also included socio-economic and demographic controls. Socio-economic status strongly influences sense of well-being (Nakhaie, Smylie, and Arnold 2007), and unemployment is detrimental to immigrants’ adjustment (Berry and Hou 2016). Kazemipur and Nakhaie (2014) showed that immigrants’ sense of attachment to Canada depends on their economic experience. Moreover, Banfi, Gianni, and Giugni’s (2016) multi-nation European study showed that a higher level of education leads to a higher level of support for democratic values. For this purpose, I included education and employment in the multivariate models. Education is measured in four categories: university degree, post-diploma, diploma, and less than diploma (reference category). Employed respondents are distinguished from those not in the labour force (reference category). Quebec is the most secularized province in the country and has had a difficult relationship with immigrants (Kazemipur 2014). Quebeckers are also less likely to support cultural minorities’ demands for religious headgear (Wright et al. 2017). Accordingly, residents of Quebec are distinguished from the rest of Canada. Other demographic control variables include gender (males are coded 1 and females 0), age (measured in 7 categories starting from 15-24 years and ending in 75 years and over) and marital status (widowed/divorced/separated are distinguished from single individuals, with married respondents as the reference group). ANALYSIS I first present distribution of ethnic and Canadian identity and pride in Canadian democracy by religious affiliation, then analyze predictors of socio-cultural orientation of immigrants using multinomial logit, followed by analysis of support for Canadian democracy using all predictors including respondents’ socio-cultural orientation. Table 1 shows the average ethnic and Canadian identity and pride in Canadian democracy for five religious-affiliatiated groups. It shows that there is no statistically significant difference between Muslims and Christians in ethnic identity. On the other hand, Muslims have a significantly higher sense of belonging to Canada and higher pride in Canadian democracy than Christians. Non-religious groups score significantly lower than Christians in all three measures of identity and democracy, 12 | Canadian Ethnic Studies/Études ethniques au Canada and Jews score lower in ethnic identity. Although not the focus of this study, overall, there is little difference between immigrants and those born in Canada with respect to Canadian identity, although those born in Canada, as might be expected, have substantially lower ethnic identity. Table 2 focusses on immigrants’ acculturation strategies (see Berry and Kim 1988). It shows that two-fifths of immigrants primarily identify with their ethno-cultural origins (separationist), closely followed by immigrants who identify with both their own and that of the host culture (integrationist). Only 7.6 percent of immigrants solely identify with the host culture (assimilationist) while 15.5 percent identify neither with the host nor their own culture (marginalized). Moreover, this table shows that Muslim immigrants are integrated more than any other group. Forty-six percent of Muslim immigrants scored above median in both indices of Canadian and ethno-cultural sense of belonging when compared to 37.9 percent of Christian immigrants, 40.2 percent of those with other religious denominations, and about 25 percent of Jews or immigrants without any religious denomination. Among all immigrant groups, those with no religious denomination and Jews were least likely to be integrated. TABLE 1. Religious Denomination, Identity and Pride in Canadian Democracy * Group is significantly different from Christians at P=.05. Ethnic Identity Canadian Identity Pride in Democracy Christian 12.20 Sig. 16.91 Sig. 11.40 Sig. Muslim 12.36 17.3 * 12.00 * Jewish 11.16 * 16.39 11.23 Other religions 12.18 16.20 11.67 No religion 11.32 * 16.14 * 10.61 * Immigrants 12.04 16.81 11.35 Canadian Born 8.36 16.86 10.15 TABLE 2. Immigrants’ Acculturation Orientation of Religious Groups (GSS 2013) Integration Assimilation Separation Marginalization Total % N % N % N % N N Christian 37.90% 2068 7.20% 392 42.00% 2293 12.90% 701 5454 Muslim 46.00% 446 7.90% 77 35.90% 348 10.20% 99 970 Jewish 26.00% 25 11.50% 11 37.50% 36 25.00% 24 95 Other Religions 40.20% 507 6.80% 86 39.50% 498 13.50% 171 1262 No Religion 25.10% 416 8.90% 147 43.50% 722 22.60% 375 1660 Total 36.70% 3462 7.60% 713 41.30% 3897 14.50% 1370 9442 Reza Nakhaie | 13 Table 3 presents multinomial logistic regressions. The estimates provide the differences in the log odds of placing oneself in the integration, assimilation, and/or marginalized groups as against the separation group for various predictors. Since the log odds may have little intuitive meaning, the exponentiated coefficients (risk ratios) are also presented and discussed. The exponential of a coefficient is the facTABLE 3. Multinomial Logistic Regression Parameter Estimates of Identity Orientation * P <.05, ** p <.01, *** p<.001. Standard Errors are based on 500 bootstrap weights Integration Assimilation Marginalization B SE Exp(B) Sig. B SE Exp(B) Sig. B SE Exp(B) Sig. Muslim -0.523 0.083 1.688 *** -0.779 0.147 2.179 *** -0.210 0.131 1.233 Jewish -0.246 0.270 0.782 -0.435 0.370 1.545 -0.733 0.273 2.082 ** Other Religions -0.292 0.077 1.340 *** -0.160 0.145 1.173 -0.231 0.110 1.260 * No Religion -0.157 0.080 0.855 * -0.206 0.125 1.229 -0.407 0.093 1.502 *** Religious -0.407 0.068 1.502 *** -0.141 0.108 0.869 -0.390 0.081 0.677 *** Immigrated Prior to 1974 -0.203 0.098 1.225 * -1.296 0.160 3.656 *** -1.075 0.128 2.929 *** Immigrated Between 1975-1994 -0.105 0.064 1.111 -0.801 0.115 2.229 *** -0.608 0.086 1.837 *** Experienced Discrimination -0.458 0.054 0.633 *** -0.270 0.097 0.763 ** -0.085 0.072 0.919 Quebec -0.060 0.071 0.941 -0.574 0.147 0.563 *** -0.240 0.103 0.787 * Diploma -0.041 0.089 1.041 -0.007 0.163 0.994 -0.147 0.130 1.158 Post-Diploma -0.117 0.091 0.890 -0.024 0.163 0.977 -0.215 0.131 1.240 University -0.204 0.089 0.815 * -0.100 0.158 1.106 -0.160 0.129 1.174 Employed -0.273 0.163 0.761 -0.288 0.285 0.750 -0.079 0.228 0.924 Not in the LF -0.245 0.165 0.783 -0.259 0.289 0.772 -0.189 0.231 0.827 Male -0.070 0.050 1.072 -0.313 0.089 1.367 *** -0.187 0.068 1.205 ** Age Groups -0.100 0.023 1.106 *** -0.032 0.041 1.033 -0.034 0.032 0.966 Widowed/Divorced/ Separated -0.076 0.080 0.927 -0.206 0.124 1.228 -0.103 0.104 1.109 Single -0.123 0.073 0.884 -0.129 0.132 0.879 -0.059 0.097 0.943 Intercept -0.393 0.208 -2.147 0.363 *** -1.269 0.287 *** Nagelkerke R2 -0.095 N -8950 14 | Canadian Ethnic Studies/Études ethniques au Canada tor by which the odds on socio-cultural orientation are multiplied for one unit of change in the predictor variable (e.g., Muslims compared to Christians). Risk ratios over 1 indicate positive relationships and risk ratios below one denote negative relationships. Pseudo R-squared is also displayed, which points to the change in terms of log-likelihood from the intercept-only model to a model with predictors included. Although it does not convey the same information as R-Squared, it is still the case that, the higher the pseudo R-square, the better it fits the model. All predictors, except age, are dichotomous, so their log odds can be directly compared. For age, one needs to exponentiate the coefficient and then take it to the power of the desired age category. Controlling for all variables, Muslim immigrants are 68.8 percent more likely to be integrated than separated when compared to Christian immigrants. They are also 2.2 times more likely to be assimilated than separated when compared to Christians. Immigrants in other religious denominations (Buddhist, Hindu, and other religions) are also significantly more likely to be integrated than Christians. The latter group, as well as Jews and those with no religious denomination, are also more likely to be marginalized than Christians. Immigrants who stated that religious and spiritual beliefs are important to them are significantly more likely to be integrated and less likely to be marginalized than separated when compared to non-religious immigrants. On the other hand, experience of discrimination decreases integration and assimilation of immigrants, by 37 percent for the former and 24 percent for the latter. Separate analysis did not reveal significant interactions between religious denomination and religiosity in explaining any combination of socio-cultural orientations. Being Muslim or having a stronger attachment to Islam does not mean weaker integration. In contrast, perception of discrimination has a negative effect on integration and assimilation. The evidence on length of residence in Canada shows that the earlier cohorts of immigrants are significantly more assimilated than recent immigrants. They also tend to be more integrated. For example, when compared to recent arrivals (those arriving after 1995), those who immigrated before 1974 are 3.7 times more likely to be assimilated than separated, and those who immigrated between 1975-94 are 2.2 times more likely. The evidence supports straight-line hypothesis. However, the length of residence also increases marginalization by 2.9 and 1.8 times for the former and latter groups, respectively. Among socio-economic and demographic variables, residency in Quebec, university education, gender, and age are important predictors of socio-cultural integration. Immigrants who reside in Quebec are less assimilated and/or marginalized than immigrants in the rest of Canada. University-educated immigrants are less integrated than separated when compared to immigrants with less than a high Reza Nakhaie | 15 school diploma. Males are more assimilated and more marginalized than females. Finally, every unit of age (measured in ten-year intervals) increases the relative risk ratio of integration by 10.6 percent. Muslims’ Integration and Democracy Is Islam incompatible with democracy? Are integrated immigrants more supportive of democracy? Norris and Inglehart (2012) showed widespread support for democracy in Muslim countries. This means that by itself, Islam cannot explain the lack of democratic systems of government in Muslim countries (see Rizzo et al. 2007). Similarly, with respect to the reality of Muslim immigrants, European research tends to show widespread support for democracy (see Doerdchler and Jackson 2012; Gundelach 2010; Maxwell 2010; Schmeets and Te Riele 2014). Here, I will test the relationship between religious denomination, perception of discrimination, and pride in democracy among immigrants in Canada. I expect that integration and support for democracy should be related because the former measures socio-cultural integration and the latter political integration. Theoretically, multiculturalism and legitimization of ethnic and cultural diversity should help develop safe spaces for the newcomers to be able to adhere and participate in the democratic process. A democratic culture ensures acceptance of ethnic, religious, or cultural diversity and equal rights for all, including for the newcomer outgroups. In turn, socio-culturally integrated individuals are expected to adhere to democratic values. On the other hand, those who perceive discrimination are expected to show less pride in Canadian democracy. In contrast, religious Muslims should not differ from non-religious Muslims (see Doerschler and Jackson 2012). Below, I will provide empirical evidence for these suggestions among immigrants in Canada. TABLE 4. Religious Denomination, Identity Orientation and Pride in Canadian Democracy Integration Assimilation Separation Marginalization Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Christian 12.02 2049 11.97 389 11.06 2248 10.44 673 Muslim 12.45 445 12.23 77 11.59 345 11.34 97 Jewish 11.76 25 9.90 11 10.94 35 11.71 24 Other Religions 12.30 503 11.85 83 10.96 489 10.22 161 No Religion 11.67 412 11.26 147 10.29 695 9.72 356 16 | Canadian Ethnic Studies/Études ethniques au Canada TABLE 5. Regression Coefficients of Pride in Canadian Democracy and Predictors * P <.05, ** p <.01, *** p<.001. Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 B SE Sig. B SE Sig. B SE Sig. B SE Beta Sig. (Constant) 11.393 0.243 *** 11.084 0.253 *** 11.384 0.254 *** 11.042 0.250 *** Male 0.539 0.061 *** 0.557 0.061 *** 0.539 0.061 *** 0.534 0.060 0.094 *** Age Group -0.028 0.028 -0.034 0.028 -0.055 0.028 -0.086 0.028 -0.054 ** Widowed/ Divorced/ Separated -0.127 0.096 -0.124 0.096 -0.096 0.095 -0.080 0.093 -0.010 Single -0.147 0.089 -0.148 0.089 -0.121 0.088 -0.093 0.086 -0.015 Immigrated Prior to 1974 -0.612 0.116 *** -0.587 0.117 *** -0.633 0.116 *** -0.593 0.114 -0.079 *** Immigrated Between 1975-1994 -0.201 0.078 ** -0.196 0.078 * -0.203 0.078 ** -0.185 0.076 -0.030 * Quebec -0.444 0.089 *** -0.429 0.089 *** -0.430 0.088 *** -0.428 0.086 -0.051 *** Diploma 0.118 0.111 0.127 0.110 0.136 0.110 0.144 0.107 0.021 Post-Diploma 0.072 0.113 0.077 0.113 0.106 0.112 0.166 0.110 0.026 University 0.094 0.111 0.103 0.111 0.142 0.110 0.208 0.108 0.035 Employed 0.269 0.200 0.282 0.200 0.211 0.199 0.287 0.194 0.050 Not in the L F 0.016 0.202 0.033 0.202 -0.072 0.202 -0.023 0.197 -0.004 Muslim 0.380 0.103 *** 0.365 0.103 *** 0.378 0.102 *** 0.250 0.100 0.027 * Other Religions -0.046 0.095 -0.040 0.095 -0.040 0.095 -0.091 0.092 -0.011 Jewish -0.004 0.303 0.046 0.303 0.055 0.301 0.251 0.295 0.009 No Religion -0.986 0.083 *** -0.806 0.092 *** -0.798 0.092 *** -0.721 0.090 -0.096 *** Religious 0.344 0.079 *** 0.377 0.079 *** 0.243 0.077 0.036 ** Experienced Discrimination -0.609 0.065 *** -0.500 0.064 -0.081 *** Integration 1.054 0.066 0.179 *** Assimilation 1.012 0.116 0.094 *** Marginalization -0.516 0.091 -0.063 *** Adjusted R2 0.042 0.044 0.053 0.096 F 24.9 24.6 28.3 45.7 N 8797 8797 8797 8797 Reza Nakhaie | 17 Table 4 evaluates the relationship between religion, socio-cultural orientations, and pride in Canadian democracy as measured by three interrelated variables regarding pride in (1) how democracy works in Canada, (2) the Canadian constitution, and (3) treatment of all groups in society. This table shows that, although all groups scored at the higher end of the democracy scale, Muslim immigrants generally scored higher than the other groups in their pride for Canadian democracy amongst all forms of acculturation strategies. The average democratic score for Muslim immigrants is 12.4 among integrationists, 12.2 among assimilationists, 11.6 among separationists, and 11.3 among the marginalized groups. Comparative figures for Christians are 12, 12, 11.1, and 10.4, respectively. In contrast, immigrants with no religion scored the lowest among all religious denominations and for all forms of orientations, except for among the assimilationists, where they scored higher than Jews. Table 5 presents ordinary least square coefficients for the relationship between forms of acculturation and pride in Canadian democracy. Four models are presented. First, I introduced all socio-demographic variables (Model 1), followed by religiosity (Model 2), perception of discrimination (Model 3), and finally socio-cultural integration (Model 4). Model 1 highlights the importance of religion, length of residency, and gender. Muslim immigrants have significantly higher pride in Canadian democracy than Christian immigrants. Moreover, this pride generally remains unchanged with the extent of their religious beliefs or perception of discrimination. It decreases by about 34 percent when acculturation strategies are included in the model, indicating that part of their pride in Canadian democracy is related to their socio-cultural integration. Immigrants with no religious denomination express less pride in Canadian democracy than Christians. However, about 20 percent of this effect is due to their differences in religiosity and another 10 percent due to their socio-cultural orientation. Religiosity increases democratic pride, while length of residency and experience of discrimination decreases it, and the effect of these are modified by socio-cultural integration or acculturation strategies. As expected, among all variables, integration closely followed by assimilation has a stronger relationship with pride in Canadian democracy (see Beta coefficients). Those who are integrated and/or assimilated score one full point higher in pride in Canadian democracy than those who have a separatist identity orientation. Further analyses revealed that religious and/or discriminated Muslims were not different from their counterparts in their pride in Canadian democracy. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION The primary objectives of this study were to inquire about the support for democracy and level of integration of Muslim immigrants compared to other religious groups and how the two are related. Contrary to the anxiety of some academics, policymakers, and the public, Muslim immigrants in Canada are equally, if not more, integrated than Christians or other religious immigrants. Further, since no interaction between religious denomination and religiosity was observed, it can be stated that religious Muslims are as integrated as non-religious Muslims and/or Christians. Muslim immigrants’ comparative high level of integration and assimilation is apparent despite their experiences of discrimination, higher poverty rates, lower chances of employment, and lower average incomes than the other groups in Canada (see Kazemipur 2014), all of which is negatively related to socio-cultural integration (Kazemipur and Nakhaie 2014; Reitz and Banerjee 2007). The evidence regarding the first-generation immigrants is similar to other Canadian research with respect to Muslim Canadians, in general (see McCoy et al. 2016; Reitz 2015; but see Kazemipur 2014). For example, Reitz (2015) showed that Muslims’ experiences in the workplace or the community differ little from other religious minorities. Similarly, Joppke’s (2014) analysis of a 2009 Gallup survey showed that Muslims in Germany and the UK strongly identified with their host country. He also showed that Muslims in Canada tend to be more integrated than Muslims in the UK. McGown’s (1999) study of Somali Muslims in Toronto, Canada and London, England showed that the former were more integrated in the host society than the latter (also see Modood 2007). The difference between Canada and UK can be explained by “Canadian exceptionalism” (Kazemipur 2014) and its institutionalized multiculturalism. With respect to democracy, this study revealed that Muslim immigrants express a higher sense of pride in Canadian democracy than Christian immigrants. Not only was there no anti-democratic sentiments among Muslim immigrants in Canada when compared to Christians or other religious denominations, but rather Muslim immigrants showed a higher pride in Canadian democracy than Christian immigrants even after controlling for socio-demographic variables, religiosity, discrimination, and acculturation strategies. In this regard, Muslim immigrants in Canada may not be exceptional. Gundelach (2010, 427) showed that Muslims in Denmark are actually more likely to support freedom of speech than Danes. Similar findings are reported for Germany (Doerdchler and Jackson (2012), the UK (Maxwell 2010) and the Netherlands (Schmeets and Te Riele 2014). Discrimination is shown to negatively affect both acculturation and pride in Canadian democracy. These findings are consistent with Vasta’s (2013, 211) argument that experiences of discrimination help “contribute to the negation of a shared sense of belonging” and with Wilcox’s (2004) findings that such experiences would have a negative effect on immigrant and minorities’ identification with state institutions. In this study, Muslims reported the highest level of discrimination compared to other religious denominations. 37.2 percent of Muslims reported experiencing 18 | Canadian Ethnic Studies/Études ethniques au Canada discrimination based on ethnicity or culture, race, physical appearance, religion, or language. Among these, experience of discrimination was the highest for ethnicity and culture (29%), race or skin colour (23.5%), and religion (21.7%), followed by language (12.1%) and physical appearance (11.4%). With respect to experiences of discrimination based on religion, Jews came close at 21.2%, followed by other religious groups (9.2%), Christians (4.2%) and non-religious group (3%). The high level of discrimination among Muslims in general and Muslims and Jews because of their religion in particular is concerning, not just because it negatively affects integration and support for democratic ideals and therefore challenges the multicultural ethos of Canada, but also because it is shown to have detrimental effects on the health of immigrants (Nakhaie and Wijesingha 2015). Although length of residence is shown to be positively associated with acculturation, unexpectedly, it negatively affected pride in Canadian democracy. Early cohorts of immigrants have less pride in Canadian democracy than the more recent cohorts. This relationship is generally not modified by religious beliefs, experience of discrimination, and/or socio-cultural orientation. This finding and the evidence that length of residence increases marginalization does not bode well for theories of cultural integration that immigrants gradually absorb the values of the host society. Political socialization (see Almond and Verba 1963), social learning (Searle and Ward 1990), the straight-line model (Gans 1973), and new assimilation model (Alba and Nee 2003) are all akin in that they argue that, in the long run, immigrants will have similar values as those of the dominant social groups. One possible explanation for the negative relationship between length of residence and pride in Canadian democracy may have to do with the cohort differences in ethno-racial composition of immigrant groups. This explanation is akin to the segmented assimilation model (Portes and Zhou 1993; Zhou 1997) that argues that integration is far from automatic and that its rate varies for different ethnic groups. It is possible that early cohorts of immigrants, given their European origins, had high expectations of Canadian democracy that, in their minds, were not met. On the other hand, recent immigrants, who are mostly from developing countries, view Canadian democracy far more favourably both because of the nature of rights and freedom in their country of origin and because they have not had enough time to experience its shortfalls in the county of destination. The differences in expectations of recent immigrants who are overwhelmingly from less democratic countries compared to earlier immigrants may have contributed to more positive and pleasant experiences of the former group towards freedom, equality, and diversity as hallmarks of Canadian democracy. Similarly, the negative relationships between discrimination and integration and/or democracy further highlights the importance of (un)pleasant interactions with the host. Integration of Muslim immigrants and their Reza Nakhaie | 19 support for democracy cannot be predicted as an inevitable outcome of their religion, or what Hamid (2016) believed as being formed fourteen centuries ago, nor is it just a straight-line process (Gans 1973). Rather, it is also based on the nature of the groups’ pleasant experiences that are consistent with expectations. Given the evidence that Muslims’ level of integration and support for democracy is higher than other religious groups, particularly Christians, why does the perception that they can’t fit in persist? Generally, a perception that Muslims are unable to adapt to the new culture ignores empirical research that Muslims’ level of integration and attachment to Canada and elsewhere is not that different from the rest of the population (for examples for Canada, see McCoy, Kirova, and Knight 2016; but see Bisin et al. 2008). Doerschler and Jackson (2012) showed that Muslims in Germany are integrating well. Norris and Inglehart’s (2002) analysis of 1995-2001 World Values surveys has shown that young Muslims in Western countries grow more liberal when compared to more traditional parents and grandparents in Islamic countries. Muslims’ level of integration also varies by European host culture (see Joppke 2014). Muslims tend to become secular in a secular environment (Cesari 2006). In Canada, Kazemipur (2014) has shown that positive socio-economic achievement and contact with non-Muslims tend to create a more peaceful coexistence between the two groups. It should also be remembered that Muslim immigrants constitute a minority group whose new social environment helps produce fundamental changes in their worldview, and that cultural and political context in the host countries tends to result in many possible outcomes such as integration, assimilation, marginalization, and even militancy among some Muslim minorities. Muslim immigrants have the potential to socio-politically integrate, and their actual level of integration is the by-product of the nature of their pleasant interactions in the host society (see Kazemipur and Nakhaie 2014). Accordingly, the idea that Islam is incompatible with liberal democracies tends to be ahistorical. It ignores that Islam’s fundamental ideological principles have changed throughout history. For example, Moaddel’s (2005) comparative analysis of the political history of Islam has shown that since the 19th century, Islam has undergone three episodic discourses as a political ideology: Islamic modernism (from the middle of the 19th century to the early 20th century), liberal nationalism (from the late 19th century to the middle of the 20th century), and Islamic fundamentalism (from the early to the late 20th century). The recent surge in Muslim protest movements and the rise of fundamentalism in some countries may have little to do with Islam per se. Rather, they tend to be consequences of rapid modernization and social upheaval resulting from the breakdown of traditional social order in Muslim-majority societies (see Hashemi 2009) and their experiences with colonial and post-colonial countries. The modernization effect is similar to eighteenth20 | Canadian Ethnic Studies/Études ethniques au Canada century conservative reactions to massive social changes in Europe (see Bratton and Denham 2014). Moreover, there is a reductionist tendency to perceive Muslims as an undifferentiated group. This view ignores that Muslims are not monolithic. On the contrary, there are significant ethnic, religious, and cultural differences among Muslims (see Abdullah 2009) and important religious identity differences within the Muslim world (Rizzo et al. 2007). Reitz (2015) has pointed out that Muslim communities reflect different backgrounds with differentiated Islamic identities. Muslims differ in democratic aspirations depending on if they are citizens of Arabic or non-Arabic Muslim majority countries (Rizzo et al. 2007).1 Similarly, Gundelach (2010) revealed that Muslim minorities in Denmark differ in their support for democracy and democratic rights depending on their country of origin. It is also a mistake to equate the views of less democratic political regimes in Muslim majority countries with that of the ordinary Muslims in these countries. In sum, based on preceding discussion, we find little support for Huntington’s (1993, 1996) argument that Muslim immigrants pose a problem or that Christianity is associated with democracy and Islam with authoritarianism, at least not among immigrants in Canada. Finally, even if we accept that Islam is incompatible with Anglo-American cultural and political systems, the perception that Muslims are unable to fit in or accept democratic values seems to be rooted in a culturalist approach that Muslim newcomers represent the cultural values of their home society. This view is problematic because immigrants tend to be a selective group of people (see Diehl et al. 2016; Norris and Inglehart 2002). They are more motivated and ambitious than nonimmigrants (Carliner 1980). Research has shown that Muslim immigrants are from amongst the most educated segments of their home country when compared to other religious groups. This is to say that Muslim immigrants tend to be from among those who may already possess some Western cultural outlooks. The evidence in this study also warrants a discussion of multicultural policies. Overall, the findings do not seem to support those who oppose multicultural policies. Opponents have argued that multiculturalism weakens the Canadian social fabric and undermines the formation of a cohesive national identity and social solidarity (Baubock 2002; Joppke 2004; Miller 1995). In fact, this study shows that immigrants, whether Muslim or otherwise, whose sense of belonging includes that of both Canada and their own ethnic-cultural heritage expressed a strong sense of pride in Canadian democracy. Consistent with multiculturalism, Muslims and other immigrants who are free and able to maintain distinct and multiple cultural identities are proud of the rights, responsibilities, and diversities embedded in Canadian democracy. More precisely—given that Muslim immigrants are somewhat more integrated than Christians or other religious immigrants, only a small percentage of Reza Nakhaie | 21 all groups opted for an assimilation strategy, and both integration and assimilation strategies resulted in about equal support for democracy—the evidence does not bode well for a policy suggestion which favours assimilation over integration and multiculturalism that ensures multiple identity formation. The evidence is supportive of Kymlicka’s (1995) argument that accommodation of minorities within a multicultural framework by promoting respect, interaction, and social integration is a useful policy. Cultural maintenance and intercultural interactions are important features of Canadian society that strengthen the Canadian national identity and social fabric. In contrast, some of the suggested policy solutions against multiculturalism discussed above may have unintended consequences such as alienation, marginalization, and radicalization of immigrants in general and Muslims in particular, resulting in a weakening of social solidarity and cohesion. However, the findings in this study that Muslim immigrants are comparatively well-integrated or that Muslims in Canada value democracy do not deny that their support for gender equality and homosexuality may not be similar to that of other Canadians (see Cochrane 2013; Norris and Inglehart 2002, 2012). Joppke (2014) argues that the key “fault lines” between Muslims and Europeans is that of ‘eros’ and not ‘demos,’ a difference that seems to vary between Arab- and non-Arab-majority Muslim nations (Rizzo et al. 2007). Nevertheless, given immigrant selectivity, a welcoming Canadian environment congruent with immigrants’ expectations, and the tendency for immigrants to adopt the cultural values of the host society, it is plausible that like in Europe (see Maliepaard and Alba 2016), Muslim immigrants’ views on gender equality and homosexuality in Canada would become similar to the majority in the long run. NOTES 1. GSS public file does not distinguish country of origins. REFERENCES Abdullah, Z. 2009. Sufis on parade: the performance of black, African and Muslim identities. Journal of the American Academy of Religion. doi:10.1093/jaarel/lfp016. Aida, C., Laitin, D., and Valfort. M. 2010. Identifying barriers to Muslim integration in France. Proceedings of the National Academic of Sciences 107.52: 384-390. Ajrouch, K. 2007. Global contexts and the veil: Muslim integration in the United States and France. Sociology of Religion 68.3: 321. Alba, R., and Nee, V. 2003. Remaking the American mainstream: Assimilation and Contemporary Immigration. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Aleksynska, M. 2007. Civic Participation of immigrants: Culture transmission and assimilation. http://www.u.arizona.edu/~jag/POL596A/MPRAcivicEur.pdf. Almond, G., and Verba, S. 1963. The Civic Culture. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 22 | Canadian Ethnic Studies/Études ethniques au Canada Banfi, E., Gianni, M., Giugni, M. 2016. Religious minorities and secularism: an alternative view of the impact of religion on the political values of Muslims in Europe. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 42.2: 292-308. Banting, K. 2014. Transatlantic convergence? The archeology of immigrant integration in Canada and Europe. International Journal 69.1: 66-84. Banting, K., and Soroka, S. 2012. Minority nationalism and immigrant integration in Canada and Europe. Nations and Nationalism 18.1: 156-176. Barry, B. 2002. Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Baubock, R. 2002. Farewell to Multiculturalism. Journal of International Migration and Integration 3.1: 1- 16. Bawer, B. 2010. Surrender: Appeasing Islam, Sacrificing Freedom. New York: Anchor Books. Berry, J. W. 1997. Immigration, acculturation, and adaptation. Applied Psychology: An International Review 46: 5-34. ———. 1999. Intercultural relations in plural societies. Canadian Psychology 40: 12-21. ———. 2003. Conceptual approaches to acculturation. In K. Chun, P. Balls Organista, and G. Mar (eds.), Acculturation: Advances in theory, measurement, and applied research (pp. 17–37). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. Berry, J., and Hou, F. 2016. Immigrant Acculturation and Wellbeing in Canada. Canadian Psychology 57.4: 254-264. Berry, J. W., and Kalin, R. 1995. Multicultural and ethnic attitudes in Canada: An overview of the 1991 national survey. Canadian Journal of Behavioural Science 27: 301–320. Berry, J., and Kim, U. 1988. Acculturation and mental health. In Dasen, J., Berry, J. and Sartorius, N. (eds.), Health and Cross-cultural Psychology (pp. 207-236). London: Sage. Berry, J. W., Phinney, J. S., Sam, D. L., and Vedder, P. 2006. Immigrant youth: Acculturation, identity, and adaptation. Applied Psychology 55: 303–332. Berry, J. W., and Sam, D. 1997. Acculturation and adaptation. In J. W. Berry, M. H. Segall, and C. Kagitcibasi (eds.), Handbook of cross-cultural psychology: Social behavior and applications (2nd ed., pp. 291–326). Boston: Allyn and Bacon. Bevelander, P., and Otterbeck, J. 2010. Young People’s attitudes towards Muslims in Sweden. Ethnic and Racial Studies 33.3: 404-425. Biles, J., Burstein, M., and Frideres, J. 2008. Conclusion. In Biles, J., Burstein, M., and Frideres, J. (eds.), Immigration and Integration in Canada in the Twenty-first Century (pp. 269-278). Montreal: McGillQueens University Press. Bissin, A. Patacchini, E., Verdier, T. and Zenou, Y. 2008. Are Muslim immigrants different in terms of cultural integration? Journal of the European Economic Association 6.2-3: 445-56. Bissoondath, Neil. 1994. Selling Illusions: The Cult of Multiculturalism in Canada. Toronto: Penguin Books. Bratton, J., and Denham, D. 2014. Capitalism and Classical Social Theory. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Caldwell, C. 2009. Reflections on the Revolution in Europe. New York: Penguin. Carliner, G. 1980. Wages, earnings, and hours of first, second, and third generation American males. Economic Inquiry 18.1: 87-102. Castles, S., and Miller, M. 2003. The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World. New York: The Guilford Press. Cesari, J. 2006. When Islam and Democracy Meet: Muslims in Europe and the United States. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Clements, B. 2013. Explaining public attitudes towards the integration of Muslims in british society: The ‘solidarity of religious.’ Journal of Contemporary Religious 28.1: 49-65. Cochrane, C. 2013. The effects of Isalm, religiosity, and socialization on Muslim-Canadian opinions about same-sex marriage. Comparative Migration Studies 1.1: 147-178. Connor, P. 2010. Contexts of immigrant recepticivity and immigrant religious outcomes: The case of Muslims in Western Europe. Ethnic and Racial Studies 33.3: 376-403. Reza Nakhaie | 23 Corak, M. 2012. Age at immigration and the education outcomes of children. In Masten, A., Liebkind, K. and Hernandez, M. (eds.), Realizing the Potential of Immigrant Youth (pp. 90-114). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Diehl, C., Lubbers, M., Mu’hlau, P., and Platt, L. 2016. Starting out: New immigrants’ socio-cultural trajectories in four European destinations. Ethnicities 16.2: 157-179. Doerschler, P., and Jackson, P. 2012. Do Muslims in Germany really fail to integrate? Muslim integration and trust in public institutions. International Migration and Integration 13: 503-523. Dona, G., and Berry, J. W. 1994. Acculturation attitudes of Central American refugees in Canada. International Journal of Psychology 29: 57–70. Ehrkamp, P. 2010. The limits of Multicultural tolerance? Liberal democracy and media portrayals of Muslim migrant women in Germany. Space & Polity 14.1: 13-32. Environic. 2016. Survey of Muslims in Canada 2016. Environics Institute for Survey Research. Fekete, L. 2008. Integration, Islamophobia and civil rights in Europe. London, UK: Institute of Race Relations. ———. 2009. A Suitable Enemy: Racism, Migration and Islamophobia in Europe. London: Pluto Press. Fetzer, J., and Soper, C. 2003. The roots of public attitudes toward state accommodation of European Muslims’ religious practices before and after September 11. Journal of Scientific Study of Religion 42.2: 247-258. Fokkema, T., and de Haas, H. 2015. Pre- and post-migration determinants of socio-cultural integration of African immigrants in Italy and Spain. International Migration 53.6: 3-26. Foner, N., and Alba, R. 2008. Immigrant religion in the US and Western Europe: Bridge or Barrier to inclusion. International Migration Review 42: 360-392. Frideres, J. 2008. Creating an Inclusive Society: Promoting Social Integration in Canada. In Immigration and Integration in Canada in the Twenty-first Century (eds.), J. Biles, M. Burstein and J. Frideres (pp. 77-101). Montreal-Kingston: McGill-Queens University Press. Fry, H. 2018. Taking Action Against Systematic Racism and Religious Discrimination Including Islamophobia. Report of the Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage. February 2018, 42th Parliament, 1st Session. Ottawa: Library of Parliament. Gans, H, 1973. Symbolic ethnicity: The future of ethnic groups and cultures in America. Ethnic and Racial Studies 2.1: 1-20. Gellner, E. 1997. The Turkish option in comparative perspective. In Bozdogan, S. and Kasaba, R. (eds.), Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey (pp. 90-114). Seattle: University of Washington Press. Gundelach, P. 2010. Democracy and denomination: Democratic value among Muslim minorities and the majority population in Denmark. Ethnic and Racial Studies 33.3: 426-450. Hamid, S. 2016. Islamic Exceptionalism: How the Struggle Over Islam Is Reshaping the World. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Hashemi, N. 2009. Islam, Secularism, and Liberal Democracy: Towards a Democratic Theory for Muslim Societies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Huntington, S. 1993. The clash of civilizations? Foreign Affairs 73: 22-49. ———. 1996. The Clash of Civilization and the Remaking of the World Order. London: Simon & Schuster. Inglehart, R., and Norris, P. 2003. The True Clash of Civilizations. Foreign Policy 135: 62-70. Ipsos. 2006. 2006 election exit poll: microdata file. Toronto, ON: Ipsos. Laurier Institute for the Study of Public Opinion and Policy, 2010/10/01. ———. 2011. 2011 election exit poll: microdata file. Toronto, ON: Ipsos. Laurier Institute for the Study of Public Opinion and Policy, 2012/07/01. Joppke, C. 2004. The Retreat of multiculturalism in the Liberal State: Theory and Policy. British Journal of Sociology 55.2: 237-257. ———. 2014. Europe and Islam: Alarmists, victims, and integration by law. West European Politics 37.6: 1314-1335. ———. 2015. The Secular State Under Seige: Religion and Politics in Europe and America. Cambridge: Polity. Kazemipur, A. 2014. The Muslim Question in Canada: A Story of Segmented Integration. Vancouver: University of British Columbia. 24 | Canadian Ethnic Studies/Études ethniques au Canada Kazemipur, A., and Nakhaie, R. 2014. The Economics of Attachment: Making a Case for a Relational Approach to Immigrants’ Integration in Canada. International Migration and Integration 14: 609-613. Koopmans, R. 2015. Religious fundamentalism and hostility against outgroups: A comparison of Muslims and Christians in Western Europe. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 41.1: 33-57. Kortmann, M. 2012. Religious governance and integration policies in Germany and Netherlands: The impact of the self-portrayal and strategies of Muslim organizations. Journal of Immigrants & Refugee Studies 10: 299-318. Kymlicka, W. 1995. Multicultural Citizenship. New York: Oxford University Press. Ley, D. 2013. Does transnationalism trump immigrant integration? Evidence from Canada’s links with East Asia. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 39.6: 921-938. Li, P. 2003. Deconstructing Canada’s discourse of immigrant integration. Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on Immigration and integration. PCERII Working Paper No. WP04-03. http://www.urbancentre.utoronto.ca/pdfs/elibrary/Cda-Discourse-Immigrant-Int.pdf. Litchmore, R., and Safdar, S. 2015. Perceptions of discrimination as markers of integration among muslim-Canadians: The role of religiosity, ethnic identity, and gender. International Migration & Integration 16: 187-204. Maliepaard, M., and Alba, R. 2016. Cultural integration in the Muslim second generation in the Netherlands: The case of gender ideology. International Migration Review 50.1: 70-94. Maxwell, R. 2010. Evaluating immigrant integration: Political attitudes across generations in Europe. International Migration Review 44.1: 25-52. McCoy, J., Kirova, A., and Knight, W. 2016. Gauging social integration among Muslims: A sense of belonging in an age of anxiety. Canadian Ethnic Studies 2: 21-52. McGown, R. 1999. Muslims in Diaspora: The Somali Communities of London and Toronto. Toronto: Toronto University Press. Miller, D. 1995. On Nationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Minsky, A. 2017. Hate crimes against Muslims in Canada increase 253% over four years. Global News, June 13. Moaddel, M. 2005. Islamic Modernism, Nationalism, and Fundamentalism: Episode and Discourse. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Modood, T. 2007. Multiculturalism. Cambridge: Polity Press. Moghissi, H., Rahnema, S., and Goodman, M. 2009. Disaspora by Design: Muslim Immigrants in Canada and Beyond. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Nakhaie, R., Smylie, L., and Arnold, R. 2007. Social inequalities, social capital, and health of Canadians. Review of Radical Political Economics 39.4: 562-585. Nakhaie, R., and Wijesingha, R. 2015. Discrimination and health of male and female Canadian immigrants. International Journal of Migration & Integration 16: 1255-1272. Nollert, M., and Sheikhzadegan, A. 2016. Participation and sharing, or peaceful co-existence? Visions of integration among Muslims in Switzerland. Social Inclusion 4.2: 95-106. Norris, P., and Inglehart, R. 2002. Islamic culture and democracy: testing the ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis. Contemporary Sociology 1: 235-263. ———. 2012. Muslim integration into Western Cultures: Between origins and destinations. Political Studies 60: 228-251. Pew. 2011. The Future of the Global Muslim Population. Projections for 2010-2030. http://www.pewforum.org/2011/01/27/the-future-of-the-global-muslim-population/. Portes, A., and Zhou, M. 1993. The new second generation: Segmented assimilation and its variants. American Academy of Political and Social Science 350: 74-96. Rane, H., Amath, N., and Faris, N. 2015. Multiculturalism and integration of multigenerational Muslims communities in Queensland, Australia. Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 24: 503-519. Reitz, J. 2015. The status of Muslim minorities following the Paris attack. In Iacobucci, M. and Toope, S. (eds.), After the Paris Attack: Responses in Canada & Europe and Around the Globe (pp. 21-27). Toronto: Toronto University Press. Reitz, J., and Banerjee, R. 2007. Racial inequality, social cohesion and policy issues in Canada. In Banting, K., Courchene, T. and Seidle, F. (eds.), Belonging, Diversity, Recognition and Shared Citizenship in Canada (pp. 489-545). Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy. Reza Nakhaie | 25 Rizzo, H., Abdel-Latif, A. and Meyer, K. 2007. The relationship between gender equality and democracy: A comparison of Arab versus non-Arab Muslim societies. Sociology 41.6: 1151-1170. Schmeets, H., and Te Riele, S. 2014. Declining social cohesion in the Netherland? Social Indicators Research 115: 791-812. Schwartz, S., and Zamboanga, B. 2008. Testing Berry’s model of acculturation: A confirmatory latent class approach. Cultural Diversity and Ethnic Minority Psychology 14.4: 275-285. Searle, W., and Ward, C. 1990. The prediction of psychological and sociocultural adjustment during crosscultural transitions. International Journal of Intercultural Relations 14: 449-464. Sides, J., and Gross, K. 2013. Stereotypes of Muslims and support for the War on Terror. The Journal of Politics 75.3: 583-598. Statham, P., and Tillie, J. 2016. Muslims in their European societies of settlement: A comparative agenda for empirical research on socio-cultural integration across countries and groups. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 42.2: 177-196. van der Noll, J., and Saroglou, V. 2015. Anti-Islam or anti-religion? Understanding objection against Islamic education. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 41.2: 219-238. Vasta, E. 2013. Do we need social cohesion in the 21th century? Multiple languages of belonging in the metropolis. Journal of Intercultural Studies 34.2: 196-213. Wilcox, S. 2004. Culture, national identity, and admission to citizenship. Social Theory and Practice 30.4: 559-582. Wilkinson, L. 2013. Culture, national identity, and admission to citizenship. Social Theory and Practice 30.4: 559-582. Wright, M., Johnston, R., Citrin, J., and Soroka, S. 2017. Multiculturalism and Muslim accommodation: Policy and predisposition across three political contexts. Comparative Political Studies 50.1: 102-132. Wuthnow, R., and Hackett, C. 2003. The social integration of practitioners of non-Western religions in the United States. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 42.4: 651-667. Zhou, M. 1997. Segmented assimilation: Issues, controversies, and recent research on new second generation. International Migration Review 31.4: 975-1008. REZA NAKHAIE is Professor of Sociology at the University of Windsor. His research interests centre around issues of diversity, equity and justice, and cultural and political forces that produce and reproduce inequality. His publications have appeared in International Criminal Justice Review, Canadian Journal of Higher Education, Social Science & Medicine, Canadian Ethnic Studies, International Journal of Migration and Integration, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Canadian Review of Sociology, Canadian Journal of Political Sciences, and Review of Radical Political Economics. 26 | Canadian Ethnic Studies/Études ethniques au Canada Reproduced with permission of copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Get Professional Assignment Help Cheaply

Are you busy and do not have time to handle your assignment? Are you scared that your paper will not make the grade? Do you have responsibilities that may hinder you from turning in your assignment on time? Are you tired and can barely handle your assignment? Are your grades inconsistent?

Whichever your reason may is, it is valid! You can get professional academic help from our service at affordable rates. We have a team of professional academic writers who can handle all your assignments.

Our essay writers are graduates with diplomas, bachelor’s, masters, Ph.D., and doctorate degrees in various subjects. The minimum requirement to be an essay writer with our essay writing service is to have a college diploma. When assigning your order, we match the paper subject with the area of specialization of the writer.

Why Choose Our Academic Writing Service?

 

Plagiarism free papers
Timely delivery
Any deadline
Skilled, Experienced Native English Writers
Subject-relevant academic writer
Adherence to paper instructions
Ability to tackle bulk assignments
Reasonable prices
24/7 Customer Support
Get superb grades consistently

How It Works

1.      Place an order

You fill all the paper instructions in the order form. Make sure you include all the helpful materials so that our academic writers can deliver the perfect paper. It will also help to eliminate unnecessary revisions.

2.      Pay for the order

Proceed to pay for the paper so that it can be assigned to one of our expert academic writers. The paper subject is matched with the writer’s area of specialization.

3.      Track the progress

You communicate with the writer and know about the progress of the paper. The client can ask the writer for drafts of the paper. The client can upload extra material and include additional instructions from the lecturer. Receive a paper.

4.      Download the paper

The paper is sent to your email and uploaded to your personal account. You also get a plagiarism report attached to your paper.

Get Professional Assignment Help Cheaply
Are you busy and do not have time to handle your assignment? Are you scared that your paper will not make the grade? Do you have responsibilities that may hinder you from turning in your assignment on time? Are you tired and can barely handle your assignment? Are your grades inconsistent?
Whichever your reason may is, it is valid! You can get professional academic help from our service at affordable rates. We have a team of professional academic writers who can handle all your assignments.
Our essay writers are graduates with diplomas, bachelor’s, masters, Ph.D., and doctorate degrees in various subjects. The minimum requirement to be an essay writer with our essay writing service is to have a college diploma. When assigning your order, we match the paper subject with the area of specialization of the writer.
Why Choose Our Academic Writing Service?

Plagiarism free papers
Timely delivery
Any deadline
Skilled, Experienced Native English Writers
Subject-relevant academic writer
Adherence to paper instructions
Ability to tackle bulk assignments
Reasonable prices
24/7 Customer Support
Get superb grades consistently

How It Works
1.      Place an order
You fill all the paper instructions in the order form. Make sure you include all the helpful materials so that our academic writers can deliver the perfect paper. It will also help to eliminate unnecessary revisions.
2.      Pay for the order
Proceed to pay for the paper so that it can be assigned to one of our expert academic writers. The paper subject is matched with the writer’s area of specialization.
3.      Track the progress
You communicate with the writer and know about the progress of the paper. The client can ask the writer for drafts of the paper. The client can upload extra material and include additional instructions from the lecturer. Receive a paper.
4.      Download the paper
The paper is sent to your email and uploaded to your personal account. You also get a plagiarism report attached to your paper.

 

PLACE THIS ORDER OR A SIMILAR ORDER WITH Essay fount TODAY AND GET AN AMAZING DISCOUNT

The post Sociology of Race and Racism appeared first on Essay fount.

What Students Are Saying About Us

.......... Customer ID: 12*** | Rating: ⭐⭐⭐⭐⭐
"Honestly, I was afraid to send my paper to you, but you proved you are a trustworthy service. My essay was done in less than a day, and I received a brilliant piece. I didn’t even believe it was my essay at first 🙂 Great job, thank you!"

.......... Customer ID: 11***| Rating: ⭐⭐⭐⭐⭐
"This company is the best there is. They saved me so many times, I cannot even keep count. Now I recommend it to all my friends, and none of them have complained about it. The writers here are excellent."

"Order a custom Paper on Similar Assignment at essayfount.com! No Plagiarism! Enjoy 20% Discount!"