DIVERSIONARY WAR AND COMPROMISE AGREEMENTS
Although we present a general model of war, for clarity of exposition we have focused on particular cases. These stylized cases suggest that democracies are only aggressive if they are nearly certain of victory. When the outcome of the war is less certain, democracies prefer negotiated settlements. Since this conclusion drives the democratic peace predictions, its robustness is worth exploring to identify the conditions under which it breaks down.
For mathematical convenience we assumed the dis- tribution of challenger types was exponential. With respect to effort level, our intuition focuses on the arguments of F(.), rather than the specific shape of the exponential distribution. That is, our arguments about effort levels are grounded upon how political institu- tions shape the rewards supporters receive and not specifically on the marginal effect of these benefits. So, with respect to effort level, our assumption that chal- lenger types are distributed exponentially is benign. With respect to the decision to fight, however, our assumption is less innocent. For example, in examining
the limiting case (W -> oc), we used the concavity of the exponential distribution. It certainly seems reason- able to assume there are diminishing marginal returns from additional rewards for supporters when a leader is already likely to remain in office, but such an assump- tion is less tenable when a leader’s initial prospect of survival is low. We may, for example, prefer to assume challengers are distributed normally, which makes the reselection decision appear as a probit model. Of course, providing a leader has reasonable prospects of survival, the logic behind our stylized case holds. For leaders who have little hope of remaining in office, however, the rationale for our stylized case diminishes and may be reversed. This implies that democratic leaders with failed domestic policies (low ii) may be extremely belligerent.
Given her institutional incentives, a democratic leader with failed public policies is unlikely to retain office unless she has an astonishing change in perfor- mance. If we think of reselection as modeled in a probit setting, then this is to say the leader starts deep in the left-hand tail. Given the increasing marginal returns on additional rewards when starting from such a low base, a leader with failed policies has an incentive to gamble everything on the outcome of conflict. It is perhaps only through a successful war that she has any signifi- cant chance of remaining in office. If a leader is in a position of accepting a negotiated settlement that leaves her with little chance of domestic survival, then, counter to our earlier argument, she faces no disad- vantage from fighting. If she loses, she will be deposed, but she would have been removed anyway. Yet, victory holds the prospects (although not necessarily high, significantly greater than with negotiations) of remain- ing in office. Hence, a democratic leader with failed policies is potentially bellicose. This, of course, is the gambling for resurrection idea inherent in the diver- sionary war theory literature (Downs and Rocke 1994;
803
This content downloaded from 169.228.91.29 on Thu, 08 Nov 2018 22:43:33 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace December 1999
Goemans 1995; Levy 1989; Richards et al. 1993; Smith 1996; Werner 1996).
These diversionary hypotheses may appear to under- mine our earlier conclusions, but this is not so. Indeed, quite to the contrary, these diversionary results are satisfying on several dimensions. Our theory does not simply state that democracies are either more cautious or more bellicose; it states the conditions under which each of these eventualities occurs. This distinction is important. Our theory does not state that a war between democracies is impossible. Rather, we show that the conditions under which a democrat will attack another democrat are more restrictive than the condi- tions under which a democrat will attack an autocrat. This constraint, which occurs because democrats are less attractive targets due to their high war effort, holds even in diversionary circumstances. Autocrats always are the more attractive targets, but when two demo- cratic leaders have unsuccessful domestic policies, war between democracies is most likely.
In terms of theory building, the diversionary hypoth- eses are pleasing. A new theoretical model is convinc- ing when it accounts for the predictions of extant models. Hence, the fact that our model simultaneously accounts for findings in both the diversionary war and democratic peace literatures strengthens our argu- ments. Indeed, we believe the most attractive feature of our institutional model, and more generally the larger project of which it is a part, is its ability to encompass results from disparate and distinct litera- tures (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1997, 1998, 1999, n.d.).
Negotiations are complex, and for convenience we have not modeled their details. The objectives of leaders during negotiations differ depending on their institutional arrangements. Since autocrats typically survive whatever the policy outcome, providing they do not squander their resources, they simply seek to maximize their gains from the process. Democratic leaders face different pressures. It is harder for them to keep their job if they perform poorly on policy. They would like to get a good deal for their nation through negotiations, but they only need a deal good enough for them to be reselected. If the negotiations break down, then the democrat must be militarily successful to satisfy domestic policy wants and to survive politically. Hence, a democratic leader may be prepared to accept a more modest settlement rather than allow negotia- tions to break down and risk being removed by failure during war. This is particularly true if the democrat faces a democratic opponent who will try hard in any war. Again, we see that democrats are unlikely to fight one another; they are likely to seek ways to succeed through negotiations even if one side must make additional concessions to avoid a breakdown.
For autocrats the story is different. They survive domestically by providing private goods. Unless the international outcome is horrendous, it is unlikely to influence their reselection prospects. Because they do not have a great incentive to avoid the breakdown of negotiations, they have a smaller incentive than dem- ocrats to make additional concessions to avoid a war. Whereas domestic policy failures make democratic
804
leaders belligerent, autocrats find it less important to keep negotiating than do democrats. Two democratic leaders are destined to fight only when neither is able to make additional concessions, a circumstance that arises only if both have failed domestic policies. The same motivations exist for autocrats, but the incentives are weaker, since autocrats are surer of reselection whatever the international outcome.
CONCLUSION
In our simple model, leaders are assumed to be moti- vated by a desire to keep their job. They allocate resources toward the pursuit of public policies that benefit all citizens and toward private goods that benefit only their key supporters. When a member of the winning coalition defects from the incumbent lead- ership, the defector puts her access to private goods at risk. That risk is assumed to increase as the selectorate increases in size and to decrease as the winning coali- tion increases in size.
The institutional arrangements of political systems influence the incentives of leaders to provide different kinds of policies. We examined the link between insti- tutions and policy choices in the context of interna- tional disputes. We demonstrated that democratic leaders, when faced with a war, are more inclined to shift extra resources into the war effort than are autocratic leaders. This follows because, as the winning coalition grows, the prospects of political survival in- creasingly hinge on successful policy performance. The extra effort made by democrats gives them a military advantage over autocrats in war. In addition, demo- cratic leaders only choose to fight when they are confident of military victory. Otherwise, they prefer to negotiate.
Democrats make relatively unattractive targets be- cause domestic reselection pressures cause leaders to mobilize resources for the war effort. This makes it harder for other states to target them for aggression. In addition to trying harder than autocrats, democrats are more selective in their choice of targets. Defeat typi- cally leads to domestic replacement for democrats, so they only initiate war when they expect to win. These two factors lead to the interaction between polities that is often termed the democratic peace. Autocrats need a slight expected advantage over other autocratic ad- versaries to initiate conflict, but they need more over- whelming odds against democratic foes. This is because democrats compensate for any initial military disadvan- tage by devoting additional resources to the war effort. In order to initiate war, democrats need overwhelming odds of victory, but that does not mean they are passive. Because democrats use their resources for the war effort rather than reserve them to reward backers, they are generally able, given their selection criteria for fighting, to overwhelm autocracies, which results in short and relatively less costly wars. Yet, democracies find it hard to overwhelm other democracies because they also try hard. In general, democracies make unattractive targets, particularly for other democracies. Hence, democratic states rarely attack one another.
This content downloaded from 169.228.91.29 on Thu, 08 Nov 2018 22:43:33 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
American Political Science Review Vol. 93, No. 4
One objection to the democratic peace concept is that it lacks a comprehensive explanation. Frameworks based on norms or on constraints account for some but not all patterns observed Our model appears to be fairly comprehensive. Two novel hypotheses are that democracies try harder and that political incentives in democracies do not make them immune from wars of imperial expansion. Evidence from other studies sup- ports the former; the latter is a well-known fact but seems to contradict core parts of the norm-based explanations of the democratic peace. Our model explains these diverse phenomena without attributing superior motives or greater civic mindedness to one kind of leader over another. The explanation is driven purely by self-interested leaders who seek to retain office and face alternative institutional arrangements.
APPENDIX
In this appendix we examine the properties of the subgame perfect equilibria of the game to show mathematically how political institutions affect the effort level that nations make once engaged in a war and how political institutions influence the conditions under which nations initiate violence. Sub- game perfect equilibria are strategy profiles that are Nash equilibria in every proper subgame of the game. Given the boundedness, continuity, and differentiability of the functions in our setup, the existence of such equilibria is guaranteed by standard results.
We consider the aspects of equilibria required to support our conclusions. First, we examine B’s effort decision. Sec- ond, we analyze A’s effort decision. For both A and B, the greater the size of a nation’s winning coalition, the greater is the wartime effort made. Third, we examine the propensity of different systems to initiate conflict by characterizing how the size of the winning coalition affects the value of conflict relative to the value of negotiations. Fourth, we build upon this result to show that the size of the negotiated settlement that makes A indifferent between fighting and negotiations is not a monotone of the size of the winning coalition.
Effort Level
Once engaged in conflict, leaders decide how hard to try. This effort increases with the size of the winning coalition. We start with B’s effort decision. B, having observed A’s effort, gA, decides what proportion of available resources to dedi- cate to the war. Suppressing all subscripts, B’s effort level, g, influences the probability that it wins the war, p(g) = PB(gA, gB) –
PROPOSITION 1. B’s optimal effort level, g*, is weakly increasing in the size of WB-
Proof Y(g, W) is B’s expected payoff from the war given effort level g.
R Y(g, W) = p(g) – k + (1 – g) w
/ / ~R
+ Tjp(g)F v + (1 -g) W
? (1 -p(g))Ftl ? (1 -g) W
where v = 1 – k + A – RIS, 1 = -k + pA – RIS, and F(.) represents the distribution of challengers, which we assume is exponential F(x) = 1 – e
Let g* = g*(W) be the effort level that maximizes B’s expected payoff given a winning coalition of size W: g*(W) =
arg maxge[O.l] Y(g, W). For what follows, we assume that this optimal effort is unique.16
There are two cases to consider: B’s optimal effort lies on a boundary (i.e., g* = 0 or g* = 1) and B’s optimal effort is interior (g* E (0, 1)). In the former case, B strictly prefers to spend either nothing (g* = 0) or all available resources (g* = 1) on the war. Straightforwardly, under these contin- gencies an infinitesimal change in W has no effect on B’s optimal effort: dg*(W)/dW = O.. Hence, we focus on the latter case. When B’s optimal effort decision is interior, the
first- and second-order conditions imply aY(g, W)/&g = 0 and &2Y(g, W/ag2 < 0.
The first-order condition implies that H(W) = aY(g, W)Iag = (p'(g)W – R + 4JWp'(g)(F(x) – F(y)) – TR(p(g)F'(x) + (1 – p(g))F'(y)))/W= 0, wherex = v + (1 – g) R/W, y = 1 + (1 – g) R/W, p'(g) = dp(g)/dg and F'(x) = dF(x)/dx. Defining the numerator of H(W) as
G(W), aH/aW = (W(aG/aW) – G(aW/&aW)/W2, which, given the first-order condition G(W) = 0, reduces to aH/8aW = (G/aJ/)/W. By the implicit differentiation rule, dg*(W)/dW = -(&H/&/aW)/H/&g). Since, by the second- order condition, aH/&g < 0, aG/&W > 0 implies dg*/dW > 0.17
Evaluating aG/&W yields aG/&W = p'(g) + Tp'(g)(F(x) –
F(y)) – RIW 4p'(g)(1 – g)(F'(x) – F'(y)) + R2/W2 ( – g)(p(g)F”(x) + (1 – p(g))F”(y)). Given that F(x) = 1 – e-x/, F'(x) = i/o e-x/, and F”(x) = _1/(Y2 e-x/, aG/&W > 0. Hence, dg*(W)/dW > 0, so optimal effort levels increase as the winning coalition grows. Q.E.D.
The analysis of A’s effort decision is analogous to that for B. Hence, we omit a proof.
PROPOSITION 2. A’s effort level, g*, is weakly increasing in the size of WA.
The Decision to Fight or Negotiate
We examine how, in addition to affecting effort levels, political institutions affect the conditions under which A initiates conflict. In the text we discussed this in terms of a stereotypical case and analyzed the limiting cases as W becomes extremely large or extremely small (W -> oo and W -> 0). Here, we provide additional results. First, we characterize how W affects Z, the payoff difference between conflict and negotiation. Second, we use this result to show that the size of the negotiated settlement that makes A indifferent between fighting and negotiations is not a mono- tone of W. Hence, whether large or small winning coalition systems require the larger payoff to avert war depends upon specific conditions.
16 Given the nonlinearity of these equations, flat spots or identical maxima are unlikely, but deterrence offers a straightforward equilib- rium selection refinement if there are any. The higher B’s effort level, the less attractive a target B becomes. Since higher effort levels deter A, and such effort levels are credible, we use the refinement that B picks the larger effort level. 17 Evaluating the second-order condition at the turning point, aG/ag = W aHiag = p”(g)W + WTp”(g)(F(x) – F(y)) + 2/p(g) p'(g)(R – W) – 2/p(g)Wp’2gT(F(x) – F(y)) + 2/p(g) p'(g)RT(F'(y) – p(g)F'(x)) + R2/WT(p(g)F”(x) + (1 – p(g))F”()). The sign of the first two terms depends uponp”(g), and the sign of the third term is determined by (R – IW). Everything else is negative.
805
This content downloaded from 169.228.91.29 on Thu, 08 Nov 2018 22:43:33 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace December 1999
The Effect of Regime on the Decision to Fight. A only initiates conflict if the value of doing so exceeds the value of a
negotiated settlement: Z(fV) = UA(WARkA(9V, gB(V)) – UA(nego) 2 0.
Writing the utility from conflict in terms of W only,
UA(WARIW) =p -k + (1 -g) R
+ I(pF( v + (1 -g) v
+ (1 – p)F(l + (1 -g) W
where p is the probability that A wins given optimal effort
levelsg andv = 1 – k + p. – RIS, andl = -k + 1i – RIS. If A chooses negotiation rather than a conflict, then her expected payoff is UA(nego) = X + NF(n + RIW) + RIW,
where n = X + [- RIS. Therefore, Z(W) = p – k + (1 – g) RIW + NV(pF(v +
(1 – g) RIW) + (1 – p)F(l + (1 – g) RIW)) – (X + NVF(n + RIW) + RIW). This expression is the payoff difference between conflict and negotiation. Next, we exam- ine how institutional features affect Z by differentiating it with respect to W: dZ/dW = dp/dg dg/dW(l + T(F(x? – F(y))) + Q + TQ(pF'(x) + (1 – p)F'(y)) + RIW2 + R/JW2 TF'(n + RIW), where Q = -dg/dWR/W – (1 – g) R/W2, x = v + (1 – g) R/W and y = 1 + (1 – g) R/W. Substituting the first-order condition from the effort decision
((1 + 4(F(x) – F(y))) = RIW ((1 + pF'(x) + (1 – p)F'(y)))/(dp/dg)), this can alternatively be written as:
dZ R R
dW= W2g (1 g)T pFFv + ( -g)-W
+ (1-p)F’ (I+ (1-g)-W + VF’ (n W)
The sign of this expression determines whether an increase in the size of W makes A more or less aggressive. A positive sign means increases in W make A more likely to use force. This expression cannot be unambiguously signed, and whether an increase in W makes war more or less likely depends upon the precise conditions. To get an idea of factors that influence the sign of this expression, however, suppose that bargaining strength approximately correlates with military strength (i.e., n p). Under such circum- stances, concavity in F(.) suggests F'(n + RIW) < (pF'(x) + (1 – p)F'(y)). Although events depend on precise conditions, this suggests that when effort levels are already high (g close to one), an increase in W makes A more aggressive (dZ/dW > 0) Alternatively, when g is low, dZ/dW < 0.
What Value of Negotiations Makes Leaders Forgo War. Next we show that the size of the negotiated settlement that is just sufficient to avoid war is not a monotonic function of coalition size. Rather, whether the size of a deal is sufficient to buy off an autocrat or a democrat depends upon the particular conditions and not just the size of the winning
coalition. Suppose n, is the value of a negotiation that makes A indifferent between negotiation and conflict (i.e., if X = n, then Z = 0).
Dropping all nonessential terms and subscripts, we let N(nc, W) define the identity of A being indifferent between conflict and negotiation: N(n- , W) = UA(attack| W) UA(nego~nc, W) = 0.
Since increasing nc increases the value of negotiations
806
relative to conflict, aN/&nc < 0. Using the implicit differen- tiation rule, we have dnc/dW = -(aNlaW)l(aNlanc). Hence, whether an increase in W results in a larger or small negotiated settlement being just sufficient to buy off A depends upon the size of aN/&W, which is equivalent to dZ/dW.
Hence, in general we cannot unambiguously determine whether an increase in W will increase or decrease the deal sufficiently to buy off A. Substantively, this implies that increasing W may increase or decrease the prospects for a negotiated settlement depending upon the precise condi- tions. Democrats need not be more dovish than autocrats.
REFERENCES
Bates, Robert H., Avner Greif, Margaret Levi, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, and Barry R. Weingast. 1998. Analytic Narratives. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Bennett, Scott D., and Allan C. Stam III. 1996. “The Duration of Interstate Wars: 1812-1985.” American Political Science Review 90 (June): 239-57.
Bennett, Scott D., and Allan C. Stam III. 1998. “The Declining Advantages of Democracy: A Combined Model of War Outcomes and Duration.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 42 (June): 344-66.
Benoit, Kenneth. 1996. “Democracies Really Are More Pacific (in General).” Journal of Conflict Resolution 40 (December): 636-57.
Brecher, Michael, and Jonathan Wilkenfeld. 1997. A Study of Crisis. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Bremer, Stuart. 1992. “Dangerous Dyads: Conditions Affecting the Likelihood of Interstate War, 1816-1965.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 26 (June): 309-41.
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce. 1981. The War Trap. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce. 1983. “The Costs of War: A Rational Expectations Approach.” American Political Science Review 77
(June): 347-57. Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, and David Lalman. 1992. War and
Reason: Domestic and International Imperatives. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siver- son, and Alastair Smith. 1997. “Inside Out.” Hoover Institution. Typescript.
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siver- son, and Alastair Smith. 1998. “Endogenous Political Institutions and the Survival of Leaders.” Hoover Institution. Typescript.
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siver- son, and Alastair Smith. 1999. “Policy Failure and Political Sur- vival: The Contribution of Political Institutions.” Journal of Con- flict Resolution 43 (April): 131-45.
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siver- son, and Alastair Smith. N.d. “Political Institutions, Political Survival and Policy Success.” In GoverningforProsperity, ed. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Hilton Root. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Forthcoming.
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, James D. Morrow, and Ethan Zorick. 1997. “Capabilities, Perception and Escalation.”American Political Science Review 91 (March): 15-27.
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, and Randolph Siverson. 1995. “War and the Survival of Political Leaders: A Comparative Study of Regime Types and Political Accountability.” American Political Science Review 89 (December): 841-55.
Dixon, William. 1994. “Democracy and the Peaceful Settlement of International Conflict.” American Political Science Review 88 (March): 14-32.
Downs, George W., and David M. Rocke. 1994. “Conflict, Agency, and Gambling for Resurrection: The Principal-Agent Problem Goes to War.” American Journal of Political Science 38 (May): 362-80.
Farber, Henry S., and Joanne Gowa. 1995. “Polities and Peace.” International Security 20 (Fall): 123-46.
Fearon, James. 1994. “Domestic Political Audiences and the Esca- lation of International Disputes.” American Political Science Re- view 88 (September): 577-92.
This content downloaded from 169.228.91.29 on Thu, 08 Nov 2018 22:43:33 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
American Political Science Review Vol. 93, No. 4
Fearon, James. 1995. “Rationalist Explanations for War.” Interna- tional Organization 39 (Summer): 379-414.
Forsythe, David P. 1992. “Democracy, War, and Covert Action.”
Journal of Peace Research 29 (November): 385-95. Goemans, Hein. 1995. “The Causes of War Termination: Domestic
Politics and War Aims.” Ph.D. diss. Department of Political Science, University of Chicago.
Hirshleifer, Jack. 1989. “Conflict and Rent-seeking Success Func- tions: Ratio vs. Difference Models of Relative Success.” Public Choice 63 (2): 101-12.
James, Patrick, and Glenn E. Mitchell II. 1995. “Targets of Covert Pressure: The Hidden Victims of the Democratic Peace.” Interna- tional Interactions 21 (1): 85-107.
Kim, Woosang, and James D. Morrow. 1992. “When Do Shifts in Power Lead to War?” American Journal of Political Science 36 (November): 896-922.
King, Gary, Michael Tomz, and Jason Wittenberg. 1998. “Making the Most of Statistical Analyses: Improving Interpretation and Presentation.” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, MA.
Lake, David A. 1992. “Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War.” American Political Science Review 86 (March): 24-37.
Layne, Christopher. 1994. “Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Demo- cratic Peace.” International Security 19 (Fall): 5-49.
Lamborn, Alan. 1991. The Price of Power. London: Unwin Hyman. Levy, Jack S. 1988. “Domestic Politics and War.” Journal of Interdis-
ciplinary History 18 (Spring): 653-73. Levy, Jack S. 1989. “The Diversionary Theory of War: A Critique.”
In Handbook of War Studies, ed. Manus I. Midlarsky. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Mansfield, Edward D., and Jack Snyder. 1995. “Democratization and War.” Foreign Affairs 74 (May/June): 79-97.
Maoz, Zeev. 1998. “Realist and Cultural Critiques of the Democratic Peace: A Theoretical and Empirical Re-assessment.” International Interactions 24 (1): 3-89.
Maoz, Zeev, and Nazrin Abdolali. 1989. “Regime Types and Inter- national Conflict, 1816-1976.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 33 (March): 3-36.
Maoz, Zeev, and Bruce M. Russett. 1993. “Normative and Structural Causes of the Democratic Peace.” American Political Science Review 87 (September): 624-38.
McGillivray, Fiona. 1997. “Party Discipline as a Determinant of the Endogenous Formation of Tariffs.” American Journal of Political Science 41 (April): 584-607.
Morgan, T. Clifton, and Sally Howard Campbell. 1991. “Domestic Structure, Decisional Constraints, and War: So Why Kant Democ- racies Fight?” Journal of Conflict Resolution 35 (June): 187-211.
Morrow, James D. 1989. “Capabilities, Uncertainty and Resolve.” American Journal of Political Science 33 (November): 941-72.
Mousseau, Michael. 1998. “Democracy and Compromise in Milita- rized Interstate Conflicts, 1816-1992.” Journal of Conflict Resolu- tion 42 (April): 210-30.
Mueller, John D. 1973. War, Presidents and Public Opinion. New York: Wiley.
Norpoth, Helmut. 1987. “Guns and Butter and Governmental Pop- ularity in Britain.” American Political Science Review 81 Septem- ber): 949-59.
Oneal, John R., and Bruce M. Russett. 1997. “The Classical Liberals
Were Right: Democracy, Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950- 1985.” International Studies Quarterly 41 (June): 267-93.
Organski, A. F. K., and Jacek Kugler. 1980. The War Ledger. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Powell, Robert. 1996a. “Stability and the Distribution of Power.” World Politics 48 (January): 239-67.
Powell, Robert. 1996b. “Uncertainty, Shifting Power, and Appease- ment.” American Political Science Review 90 (December): 749-64.
Ray, James Lee. 1995. Democracies in International Conflict. Colum- bia: University of South Carolina Press.
Raymond, Gregory A. 1994. “Democracies, Disputes, and Third-
Party Intermediaries.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 38 (March): 24-42.
Reiter, Dan, and Allan Stam III. 1998a. “Democracy and Battlefield Military Effectiveness.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 42 (June): 259-77.
Reiter, Dan, and Allan Stam III. 1998b. “Democracy, War Initiation and Victory.”American Political Science Review 92 (June): 377-89.
Richards, Diana, T. C. Morgan, R. K. Wilson, V. L. Schwebach, and G. D. Young. 1993. “Good Times, Bad Times, and the Diversion-
ary Use of Force.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 37 (September): 504-35.
Riker, William. 1962. The Theory of Political Coalitions. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Riker, William. 1996. The Strategy of Rhetoric. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Russett, Bruce M. 1995. Grasping the Democratic Peace. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Schultz, Kenneth. 1996. “Domestic Competition and Bargaining in International Crises.” Ph.D. diss. Department of Political Science, Stanford University.
Schwartz, Thomas, and Kiron Skinner. 1997. “Democracy and the Paradox of Perpetual Peace.” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washing- ton, D.C.
Senese, Paul D. 1997. “Between Dispute and War: The Effect of Joint Democracy on Interstate Conflict Escalation.” Journal of Politics 59 (February): 1-27.
Siverson, Randolph M. 1995. “Democracies and War Participation: In Defense of the Institutional Constraints Argument.” European Journal of International Relations 1 (December): 481-90.
Smith, Alastair. 1996. “Diversionary Foreign Policy in Democratic Systems.” International Studies Quarterly 40 (March): 133-53.
Smith, Alastair. 1998. “International Crises and Domestic Politics.” American Political Science Review 92 (September): 623-38.
Spiro, David. 1994. “The Insignificance of the Liberal Peace.” International Security 19 (Fall): 50-86.
Stam, Allan C., 1996. Win, Lose or Draw: Domestic Politics and the Crucible of War. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Thompson, William R., and Richard Tucker. 1997. “A Tale of Two Democratic Peace Critiques.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 41 (June): 428-54.
Ward, Michael D., and Kristian S. Gleditsch. 1998. “Democratizing for Peace.” American Political Science Review 92 (March): 51-62.
Werner, Suzanne. 1996. “Absolute and Limited War: The Possibili- ties of Foreign Imposed Regime Change.” International Interac- tions 22 (July): 67-88.
807
This content downloaded from 169.228.91.29 on Thu, 08 Nov 2018 22:43:33 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Contents
image 1
image 2
image 3
image 4
image 5
image 6
image 7
image 8
image 9
image 10
image 11
image 12
image 13
image 14
image 15
image 16
image 17
Issue Table of ContentsAmerican Political Science Review, Vol. 93, No. 4, Dec., 1999
Volume Information [pp.1037-1044]
Front Matter [pp.i-xi]
Errata: “Lessons of Welfare: Policy Design, Political Learning, and Political Action” [p.vi]
Value Pluralism and Liberal Political Theory [pp.769-778]
Democracy and Social Spending in Latin America, 1980-92 [pp.779-790]
An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace [pp.791-807]
Demand Competition and Policy Compromise in Legislative Bargaining [pp.809-820]
Unified Government, Divided Government, and Party Responsiveness [pp.821-835]
Was James Madison Wrong? Rethinking the American Preference for Short, Framework-Oriented Constitutions [pp.837-849]
Forum
The Effects of Negative Political Advertisements: A Meta-Analytic Assessment [pp.851-875]
Do Negative Campaigns Mobilize or Suppress Turnout? Clarifying the Relationship between Negativity and Participation [pp.877-889]
Negative Campaign Advertising: Demobilizer or Mobilizer? [pp.891-899]
Replicating Experiments Using Aggregate and Survey Data: The Case of Negative Advertising and Turnout [pp.901-909]
Church and State in Stanley Fish’s Antiliberalism [pp.911-924]
A Reply to J. Judd Owen [pp.925-930]
Correction to “The Political Determinants of International Trade” [pp.931-933]
Book Review EssayPolitical Science and the Jews: A Review Essay on the Holocaust, the State of Israel, and the Comparative Analysis of Jewish Communities [pp.935-945]
Book Reviews
Political Theory
Get Professional Assignment Help Cheaply
Are you busy and do not have time to handle your assignment? Are you scared that your paper will not make the grade? Do you have responsibilities that may hinder you from turning in your assignment on time? Are you tired and can barely handle your assignment? Are your grades inconsistent?
Whichever your reason may is, it is valid! You can get professional academic help from our service at affordable rates. We have a team of professional academic writers who can handle all your assignments.
Our essay writers are graduates with diplomas, bachelor’s, masters, Ph.D., and doctorate degrees in various subjects. The minimum requirement to be an essay writer with our essay writing service is to have a college diploma. When assigning your order, we match the paper subject with the area of specialization of the writer.
Why Choose Our Academic Writing Service?
Plagiarism free papers
Timely delivery
Any deadline
Skilled, Experienced Native English Writers
Subject-relevant academic writer
Adherence to paper instructions
Ability to tackle bulk assignments
Reasonable prices
24/7 Customer Support
Get superb grades consistently
How It Works
1. Place an order
You fill all the paper instructions in the order form. Make sure you include all the helpful materials so that our academic writers can deliver the perfect paper. It will also help to eliminate unnecessary revisions.
2. Pay for the order
Proceed to pay for the paper so that it can be assigned to one of our expert academic writers. The paper subject is matched with the writer’s area of specialization.
3. Track the progress
You communicate with the writer and know about the progress of the paper. The client can ask the writer for drafts of the paper. The client can upload extra material and include additional instructions from the lecturer. Receive a paper.
4. Download the paper
The paper is sent to your email and uploaded to your personal account. You also get a plagiarism report attached to your paper.
Get Professional Assignment Help Cheaply
Are you busy and do not have time to handle your assignment? Are you scared that your paper will not make the grade? Do you have responsibilities that may hinder you from turning in your assignment on time? Are you tired and can barely handle your assignment? Are your grades inconsistent?
Whichever your reason may is, it is valid! You can get professional academic help from our service at affordable rates. We have a team of professional academic writers who can handle all your assignments.
Our essay writers are graduates with diplomas, bachelor’s, masters, Ph.D., and doctorate degrees in various subjects. The minimum requirement to be an essay writer with our essay writing service is to have a college diploma. When assigning your order, we match the paper subject with the area of specialization of the writer.
Why Choose Our Academic Writing Service?
Plagiarism free papers
Timely delivery
Any deadline
Skilled, Experienced Native English Writers
Subject-relevant academic writer
Adherence to paper instructions
Ability to tackle bulk assignments
Reasonable prices
24/7 Customer Support
Get superb grades consistently
How It Works
1. Place an order
You fill all the paper instructions in the order form. Make sure you include all the helpful materials so that our academic writers can deliver the perfect paper. It will also help to eliminate unnecessary revisions.
2. Pay for the order
Proceed to pay for the paper so that it can be assigned to one of our expert academic writers. The paper subject is matched with the writer’s area of specialization.
3. Track the progress
You communicate with the writer and know about the progress of the paper. The client can ask the writer for drafts of the paper. The client can upload extra material and include additional instructions from the lecturer. Receive a paper.
4. Download the paper
The paper is sent to your email and uploaded to your personal account. You also get a plagiarism report attached to your paper.
PLACE THIS ORDER OR A SIMILAR ORDER WITH Essay fount TODAY AND GET AN AMAZING DISCOUNT
The post Diversionery war and compromise agreements appeared first on Essay fount.
What Students Are Saying About Us
.......... Customer ID: 12*** | Rating: ⭐⭐⭐⭐⭐"Honestly, I was afraid to send my paper to you, but you proved you are a trustworthy service. My essay was done in less than a day, and I received a brilliant piece. I didn’t even believe it was my essay at first 🙂 Great job, thank you!"
.......... Customer ID: 11***| Rating: ⭐⭐⭐⭐⭐
"This company is the best there is. They saved me so many times, I cannot even keep count. Now I recommend it to all my friends, and none of them have complained about it. The writers here are excellent."
"Order a custom Paper on Similar Assignment at essayfount.com! No Plagiarism! Enjoy 20% Discount!"
